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Summary
Trac source identication aims to overcome obfuscation techniques that hide trac
sources to evade detection. Common obfuscation techniques include IP address spoong,
encryption together with proxy, or even unifying packet sizes. On one hand, trac source
identication provides the technical means to conduct web access surveillance so as to
combat crimes even if the trac are obfuscated. Yet on the other hand, adversary may
exploit trac souce identication to intrude user privacy by proling user interests.
We lay out a framework of trac source identication, in which we investigate the
general approaches and factors in designing a trac source identication scheme with
respect to dierent trac models and analyst's capabilities.
Guided by the framework, we examine three trac source identication applications,
namely, tracing back DDoS attackers, passively ngerprinting websites over proxied and
encrypted VPN or SSH channel, and actively ngerprinting websites over Tor.
In the analysis of identifying DDoS attackers, we nd out that with the information
of network topology, it is unnecessary to construct packet marks with sophisticated struc-
tures. Based on this observation, we design a new probabilistic packet marking scheme
that can signicantly improve the traceback accuracy upon previous schemes, by increas-
ing the randomness in the collection of packet marks and hence the amount of information
they transmit.
We develop a passive website ngerprinting scheme applicable to TLS and SSH tun-
nels. Previous website ngerprinting schemes have demonstrated good identication ac-
curacy using only side channel features related to packet sizes. Yet these schemes are
rendered ineective under trac morphing, which modies the packet size distribution of
a source website to mimic some target website. However, we show that trac morphing
has a severe limitation that it cannot handle packet ordering while simultaneously satis-
fying the low bandwidth overhead constraint. Hence we develop a website ngerprinting
scheme that makes use of the packet ordering information in addition to packet sizes.
Our scheme enhances the website ngerprinting accuracy as well as withstands the trac
morphing technique.
Extending from the passive website ngerprinting model, we propose an active website
vi
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ngerprinting model that can be applied to essentially any low latency, encrypted and
proxied communication channel, including TLS or SSH tunnels and Tor. Our model is
able to recover web object sizes as website ngerprint features, by injecting delay between
object requests to isolate the download of data for each object. The scheme we develop
following the active model obtains high identication accuracy. It drastically reduces the
anonymity provided by Tor.
Through our study, we nd that protecting user privacy involves tradeo between com-
munication anonymity and overheads, such as bandwidth overhead, delay, and sometimes
even computation and storage. Currently, the most reliable countermeasures against traf-
c source identication are packet padding and adding dummy trac. The aggressiveness
of applying the countermeasures and the willingness to trade o the overheads impact
the eectiveness of the anonymity protection.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This introductory chapter gives the motivation of our thesis research, outlines the scope of prob-
lems we tackle and presents the main contributions we make.
Privacy and anonymity are some central issues in network security. Both legitimate
and malicious trac sources may apply obfuscation techniques in web browsing to by-
pass surveillance. Common trac source obfuscation techniques include IP spoong,
encryption and proxy. Yet even if some obfuscation techniques are applied, remote trac
sources may still be identied using trac analysis. As practical applications lead to
deployed obfuscation techniques, and the loopholes of obfuscation techniques in turn lead
to exploits by trac source identication schemes, limitations following from the existing
source identication schemes and countermeasures motivate us to study the approach to
designing good source identication techniques and defences.
This introductory chapter is organized as follows. Firstly, motivations that lead us to
research on the trac source identication problem are discussed in Section 1.1. Next the
models and assumptions used in our investigation are outlined in Section 1.2. We then
summarize the main contributions of our research in Section 1.3. Finally, we outline the
thesis organization in Section 1.4.
1.1 Motivation
We are motivated to research on the problem of identifying obfuscated web trac sources,
as it has important applications and the current techniques and countermeasures have
some insuciencies. We elaborate on the motivation by rst giving example application
scenarios where web trac source identication is the central technical issue. Next we
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briey review deployed techniques that are in support of anonymous web surng. We
point out not only the protections each technique provides, but also the loopholes they
leave open. Then we discuss existing trac analysis techniques that exploit loopholes of
the obfuscation techniques to identify web trac sources. We point out the insuciencies
of existing trac source identication schemes, which motivates us to research on the web
trac source identication problem.
Application Scenarios
Web trac source identication techniques can be utilized by legislative warden to ensure
cyber security as well as be exploited by adversary to compromise web access anonymity.
The World Wide Web carries an abundance of information which is convenient to ac-
cess. From reading local newspaper to checking stock quotes, surng the web has become
a vital tool. Web surng is undoubtedly a prevalent Internet application. However, web
browsing itself can be turned into a threat to user privacy. User identity or interests often
are sensitive information, yet user interests can be proled by studying the websites they
surf. Such valuable information can be sold, or used to inject customized advertisements
to get commissions from any resulting clicks. When users receive loads of uninvited ad-
vertisements targeting their specics, their privacy is at obvious risk. Sensitive personal
information, such as medical, nancial, or family issues, are on the verge of being ex-
posed. Therefore, there is a strong demand for privacy from users as with whom they are
communicating or which websites they surf. Yet for business, there are strong nancial
incentives to identify the websites users surf so as to harvest web surfers' interests.
Under network attacks, web servers and clients alike want to identify the culprit (the
attack trac source). Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is an eective means
to disable web services of business rivals. The attack is easy to launch with the support
of voluminous bot networks, but dicult to prevent. Besides, there is strong nancial
interest to launching a DDoS attack. Business owners will be eager to hunt down the bots
if their websites are attacked. While servers can be victims of DDoS attack, clients can be
victims of Cross Site Scripting (XSS) attack. XSS attack has taken up a rising proportion
in network attacks in recent years. Malicious codes are automatically downloaded when
users visit some infected web severs in XSS attack. By identifying the websites that
victims visit, it narrows down the suspects who spread the malicious codes.
The ability to identify web trac sources is desired by parents, governments, law en-
forcement agencies, and many others. Parents want to monitor web accesses to protect
youngsters from the inuence of outrageous contents. Governments want to detect any
breach of censorship to online political contents. Law enforcement agencies need to con-
duct electronic surveillance so as to combat crime, terrorism, or other malicious activities
exploiting the Internet.
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Overall, both defences against and techniques to identify web trac sources are needed
in practice, but in dierent contexts. They can positively benet attack forensics and web
access surveillance over obfuscated communication channel. Yet they can also compromise
user privacy if misused.
Advantages and Drawbacks of Current Protection Tools
The currently deployed techniques which support data obfuscation in web surng include
dierent constructions over encryption and proxy, such as VPN or Tor.
In a simple communication environment without encryption or proxy, user identity
can be revealed and associated with browsing a particular website by information in the
transmitted data, e.g. user ID, phone number, or IP addresses. Note that it is even
easier for ISPs to identity the websites that a user browse, since ISPs have the IP-to-user
mappings and can easily log the IP addresses of websites that the user visits. However,
proliferation of anonymous communication systems has posed signicant challenges to the
task.
Encryption and proxy are two main deployed tools that protect the privacy in web
browsing. One possible construction is for users to access websites via a proxy, and encrypt
the link between user and proxy. Proxy hides the direct connection between user and web
server by rewriting the source and destination pairs. Encryption provides condentiality
of data to prevent identifying websites from contents. The encrypted links are possible at
the link layer using WEP/WPA to a wireless base station, or at the network layer using
IPsec ESP mode to a VPN concentrator, or at the transport layer using an SSH tunnel
to an anonymizing proxy [10].
The single proxy construction does not protect the communication privacy from the
proxy. Another construction employs multi-layered encryption with multiple proxies.
Such construction is implemented in Tor, which is a Peer-to-Peer network that provides
anonymous communication service. Furthermore, Tor unies the packet sizes. Fixed
packet size signicantly increases the diculty to distinguish websites by size related fea-
tures. Encrypted communication through multiple proxies make the endpoints indistin-
guishable from the relaying proxies. No one proxy knows both the source and destination.
Encryption based protocols have given users a false impression of condentiality of
web surng. An encrypted connection is not sucient to remove trac patterns that often
reveal the website a user visits. For example, size of the base HTML le of a webpage
already leaks much identifying information [16].
Although one or more intermediate proxies can hide the direct connection between a
user and the web server, they have not broken the correlation in the volume or timing of
the incoming and outgoing trac. The propagation of a burst of trac can iteratively
reveal the communication path through multiple proxies. Even if information from the
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size channel is blocked, the timing channel still exposes much information. Because of the
low latency requirement, anonymous communication systems that support web browsing
all refrain from intentionally changing the packet delays. Packets sent and received in an
interval are correlated at the sending and receiving ends.
Insuciencies of Current Trac Source Identication Techniques
Trac source identication techniques exploit the loopholes of data obfuscation techniques
to identify trac sources. Trac source identication techniques include packet marking,
ow marking and ngerprinting. Each technique applies to certain trac models.
The class of probabilistic packet marking (PPM) schemes [69, 74, 35, 93] applies
to tracing bots manipulated to launch DDoS attacks using spoofed IP addresses. In
PPM, routers embed partial path information into headers of probabilistically sampled
packets they transmit. A victim server having received a collection of packet marks,
reconstructs the DDoS attack paths from pieces of path information. The schemes have
shown good performance in identifying one or more attack paths. However, the structures
of packet marks as proposed in dierent schemes have only subtle dierences. It remains
unclear how to fairly compare which structure is better, given their minor dierences in
assumptions. Can we envision an optimal PPM scheme and improve the current designs
towards the optimal? These questions are not yet answered.
Fingerprinting applies to identifying the websites user accesses through low latency
encrypted tunnels. In website ngerprinting attack, adversary observes some trac pat-
terns of websites when they are fetched via an encrypted tunnel. From the side channel
data of encrypted HTTP streams, the adversary builds a database of website ngerprints.
Victim's web trac is matched against the ngerprint database to infer the website iden-
tity. Previous works have demonstrated the feasibility of using size related features to
ngerprint websites in the single proxy case [40, 78, 10, 50]. However, most website
ngerprinting schemes rely on size related features alone, which makes them unable to
withstand the countermeasure of trac morphing [90]. We are interested to nd out if
there are additional relevant website ngerprint features, so as to defend against trac
morphing and to enhance the website ngerprint identication accuracy.
Flow marking has been demonstrated to be capable of associating a pair of communi-
cating sources in trac conrmation attacks against Tor [87, 94]. Flow marking techniques
require control at both ends of the communication. One for watermark embedment, and
the other for watermark verication. The question arises whether we can extend the
website ngerprinting model from VPN to Tor (the de facto standard of anonymous com-
munication system), so as to identify websites accessed over Tor by monitoring only the
client end of the communication. Existing website ngerprinting attacks are not suitable
for direct application to Tor. The reason lies in that the packet size related ngerprint
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features they rely on are not observable over Tor, because Tor transmits messages in xed
length cells. Experiments on one such scheme [39] show that it performs very well on
identifying websites over SSH or TLS tunnels (up to 97% identication accuracy among
775 URLs), but it gives low accuracy when applied over Tor (3% accuracy among 775
URLs). There is not yet any reliable website ngerprinting models or techniques on Tor.
1.2 Purpose and Scope
Bearing in mind the unsolved problems discussed in the previous section, we further
investigate the trac source identication problem in this thesis. The purpose of this
thesis is to study the models and mechanisms to identify obfuscated trac sources in web
browsing trac, such as in attack circumstances where IP addresses are spoofed or in
encrypted and proxied communications.
We develop a framework of trac source identication that gives a taxonomy of its sub
models. The domain of trac source identications is classied by attributes of trac
model or investigator capability. From the dependency among model components, we
analyze criteria that guides the scheme design. The principles are substantiated in our
scheme constructions in several problem scenarios.
Under the framework, we investigate three specic trac models, (i) ooding DDoS
attack with IP spoong, (ii) encrypted and proxied communication, e.g. through SSH
or SSL/TLS tunnel, and (iii) low latency mix network, or Tor. The trac sources to
identify in DDoS attacks are the attack paths or bots swamping a victim server, while
the sources to identify in web browsing through SSH or SSL/TLS tunnels or Tor are
the sensitive websites user accesses. We are not dealing with anonymized trac logs to
associate servers with their pseudonyms in this thesis.
We propose an analysis model for the class of probabilistic packet marking schemes
for IP traceback, and we propose an active website ngerprinting model that works on
any low latency, encrypted and proxied communication channel, including SSH, SSL/TLS
tunnels and Tor network.
The source identication techniques we focus on are packet marking, passive and
active trac ngerprinting. Along the process of scheme development, we analyze the
eectiveness of certain countermeasures, and propose our own countermeasures.
In Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, many compromised hosts ood the
victim with an overwhelming amount of trac. The victim's resources are exhausted and
services to users become unavailable. During a DDoS attack, attack nodes often perform
address spoong to hide their identities and locations. IP traceback aims to overcome
address spoong and uncover the attack paths or sources. Identifying the attack sources
enables legislature to ascertain the responsible persons. It can also be performed prior to
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remedy actions, such as packet ltering, to isolate the attacker trac. While traceback
is motivated by DDoS attacks, it also benets analysis of legitimate trac. Potential
applications of traceback include trac accounting and network bottleneck identication.
Traceback schemes assume network routers are cooperative in embedding the required
packet marks for inspection by victim servers. We do not explicitly handle \stepping
stones" along the attack paths, but rely on autonomous systems to exchange and compile
their results after analysis. We focus on designing a good quality packet marking scheme
for cooperative routers for IP traceback.
Web browsing trac through VPN (Virtual Private Network) are encrypted by SSL
and proxied by the VPN server. VPN is a technology that allows users physically outside
the private network to bring themselves virtually inside it, thus gaining access to all the
resources that would be available if the users are physically inside the network. Users
who browse websites with VPN can bypass censorship at their physical network. Website
ngerprinting provides a means to track the website accessed, utilizing the side channel
information leaked from the encrypted and proxied HTTP streams. We improve upon
existing website ngerprinting scheme by re-examining the selection of ngerprint features.
Our VPN website ngerprinting scheme also work on other SSH or SSL/TLS encrypted
tunnels.
Extending from the passive website ngerprinting approaches over SSH or SSL/TLS
tunnels, we tackle website ngerprinting over Tor. As communication relationship is some-
times sensitive information, Tor aims to protect anonymity of the conversing parties. Tor
is designed based on mix network, where multiple Tor nodes act as proxies in transmitting
xed length packets with layered encryption. However, website ngerprinting is a threat
to user privacy in web browsing, even over Tor. Tor conceals much size related features
in trac, which makes passive trac analysis dicult. We design an active website n-
gerprinting model that retrieves certain feature values so as to ngerprint and identify
the website from an HTTP stream anonymously transmitted by Tor. The active website
ngerprinting model and scheme we design also apply to website ngerprinting over VPN,
SSH or SSL/TLS tunnels.
Same as existing website ngerprinting models, our models assume that HTTP streams
of simultaneous accesses to dierent websites, e.g. tagged browsing, are successfully sep-
arated for identication. We focus on developing systems that identify the website from
each monitored HTTP stream.
1.3 Main Contributions
We build a framework that encompasses dierent web trac source identication scenar-
ios. The framework is useful for deriving source identication approaches suitable for the
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underlying trac models.
We investigated source identication approaches in three trac models under the
framework, (i) DDoS attack trac, i.e. ooding packets with spoofed IPs, (ii) VPN
trac, i.e. encrypted and proxied trac, and (iii) Tor trac, i.e. encrypted and proxied
trac with xed packet sizes.
DDoS Traceback
We model Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM) schemes for IP traceback as an identi-
cation problem of a large number of markers. Each potential marker is associated with a
distribution on tags, which are short binary strings. To mark a packet, a marker follows
its associated distribution in choosing the tag to write in the IP header. Since there are a
large number of (for example, over 4,000) markers, what the victim receives are samples
from a mixture of distributions. Essentially, traceback aims to identify individual dis-
tribution contributing to the mixture. The general model provides a platform for PPM
schemes comparison and helps to identify the appropriate system parameters. We show
that entropy is a good evaluation metric of packet marking quality such that it eectively
predicts the traceback accuracy. We nd that embedding hop count in tags reduces the
entropy.
We propose Random Packet Marking (RPM), a simple but eective PPM scheme,
guided by the general PPM model. RPM does not require sophisticated structure or rela-
tionship among the tags, and employs a hop-by-hop reconstruction similar to AMS [74].
Simulations show improved scalability and traceback accuracy over prior works. In a large
network with over 100K nodes, 4,650 markers induce 63% of false positives in terms of
edges identication using the AMS marking scheme; while RPM lowers it to 2%. The
eectiveness of RPM demonstrates that with prior knowledge of neighboring nodes, a sim-
ple and properly designed marking scheme suces in identifying large number of markers
with high accuracy.
VPN Fingerprinting
We examine web trac transmitted over an encrypted and proxied channel to discern
the website accessed. Proles of popular websites are gathered, which contain website
ngerprints developed from side channel features of the encrypted and proxied HTTP
streams, then we identify the website accessed in a test trace by comparing the trace
ngerprint against the library of website proles to nd a good match. Under a passive
trac analysis model, we develop a scheme to ngerprint websites that utilizes two trac
features, namely the packet sizes and ordering. Packet ordering was not thoroughly
exploited in website ngerprinting previously.
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Our scheme yields an improved identication accuracy over prior work (Liberatore and
Levine's scheme [50] is used as our reference scheme) in both classication and detection
scenarios. The detection scenario is more dicult since it is unknown if a test stream
comes from the proled websites. In the classication scenario, our scheme achieves an
accuracy of 97% on analyzing 30-second long OpenVPN test streams from 1,000 websites.
On identifying the 6-second long OpenSSH test streams of 2,000 websites, our accuracy
reaches 81% with 11% improvement from the reference scheme. In the detection scenario,
the equal error rate of our scheme is 7%, while that of the reference scheme is 20%; and
the minimum total error rate (i.e. sum of false positive rate and false negative rate) is at
14% for our scheme versus 36% for the reference scheme.
Trac morphing [90] defends against website ngerprinting by changing the packet
size distribution to mimic the trac from a target website, while minimizing the band-
width overhead. Our scheme withstands trac morphing by using packet ordering to
dierentiate websites that have similar packet size distributions. Our scheme distin-
guishes 99% of the morphed trac from the mimicked target, while the reference scheme
distinguishes only 25%. We note that there is tradeo between security and bandwidth
eciency in morphing. If morphing considers some ordering information to strengthen
anonymity, then its bandwidth eciency is severely degraded to be worse than a simple
mice-elephant packet padding.
We empirically analyze the ngerprint consistency, under dierent pipeline settings,
with static and dynamic websites, and over time. Evaluation shows that our website
ngerprints are robust to variations in HTTP pipelining congurations, and that they are
stable over time with only 6% needs reproling after a month.
Active Tor Fingerprinting
Tor is the de facto standard of low latency anonymous network. It protects anonymous
communication with layered encryption, onion routing and xed length cells in data trans-
mission. We propose an active trac analysis model to perform website ngerprinting
over Tor. In our active approach, the adversary, who acts as a man in the middle between
the user and the Tor entry node, holds any HTTP requests till the ongoing response is
fully transmitted. It undoes interleaved object transmissions to reveal individual web
object sizes. Object sizes and ordering are used as our website ngerprint features. While
previous work exists on trac conrmation attacks, ours is the rst to consider website
ngerprinting over Tor, which does not require controlling both ends of an anonymous
communication. Our scheme achieves an identication accuracy of over 67.5% of 200
websites. In contrast, random guess is expected to correctly identify a website with prob-
ability 0.5%. We show that our active model is feasible to ngerprint websites accessed
through Tor.
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To summarize, the main contributions of this thesis are:
 Proposed a general model of Probabilistic Packet marking (PPM) schemes for IP
traceback. Proposed using entropy in the collection of packet marks as an evalua-
tion metric to predict the traceback accuracy with an optimal path reconstruction
algorithm.
 Proposed a traceback scheme that increases the randomness of packet marks and
hence improves the traceback accuracy.
 Proposed a passive website ngerprinting scheme over VPN that introduced packet
ordering into ngerprint features, in addition to packet sizes.
 Defeated the trac morphing technique, by exploiting its limitation on lack of packet
ordering consideration or its constraint on bandwidth eciency.
 Proposed an active website ngerprinting model applicable to any low latency en-
crypted and proxied communication channel, and developed a scheme following the
model that signicantly reduces the anonymity provided by Tor.
1.4 Thesis Organization
Body of this thesis is organized as follows:
1. Chapter 1 is this introductory chapter.
2. In Chapter 2, we present the background on HTTP stream patterns over VPN, and
Tor trac characteristics. We also review the current developments of web trac
source identications. They serve for the comparative analysis in our research.
3. We lay out a framework for trac source identication in Chapter 3. It classi-
es the domain of trac source identication by the attributes of trac model or
investigator capability. The criteria for designing a source identication scheme
under several trac models and analyst's capabilities are laid out. The principles
are substantiated in our schemes proposed for the investigation of trac sources in
several specic problem scenarios, namely, DDoS traceback, passive website nger-
printing over VPN and active website ngerprinting over Tor, which are presented
in subsequent chapters.
4. We provide a general model of probabilistic packet marking (PPM) schemes for IP
traceback in Chapter 4. We propose in the model an evaluation metric to fairly
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evaluate packet marking qualities. The model analyzes under ooding DDoS at-
tacks, the common structures in packet marks adopted by existing schemes, and
compares their assumptions and approaches to path reconstruction.
5. Inspired by the ndings from the previous chapter, we design a PPM scheme named
Random Packet Marking in Chapter 5. The scheme improves the quality of packet
marks and hence increases the DDoS attacker identication accuracy over previous
schemes.
6. We develop a passive website ngerprinting scheme that utilizes packet ordering
information in conjunction to packet sizes in Chapter 6. The scheme applies over
VPN, SSH or SSL/TLS encrypted tunnels to identify the website accessed in an
HTTP stream. We can use side channel features of packet ordering and sizes to
ngerprint websites because encryption and proxy have not severely change them.
7. We analyze the eectiveness of our passive website ngerprinting scheme against
trac morphing in Chapter 7. Trac morphing is designed to defend against web-
site ngerprinting with a bandwidth eciency constraint, which makes it unable to
handle website ngerprinting schemes that account for packet ordering. We suggest
a countermeasure to website ngerprinting that exploits randomization in packet
sizes and HTTP request ordering, with the aim to aggressively remove trac fea-
tures in both sizes and timing channels.
8. Built on the passive website ngerprinting techniques over VPN, we propose an
active website ngerprinting model against Tor and demonstrate that it is feasible
to identify websites from Tor protected trac in Chapter 8. The xed packet size in
this trac model signicantly increases the diculty in website ngerprinting. We
therefore use an active approach to obtain the sizes and ordering related features to
be website ngerprints.
9. We conclude the thesis and point out directions for future work in Chapter 9. We
summarize the ndings from constructing and analyzing trac source identication
schemes under dierent trac models. We also point out practical constraints that
we have yet to address, and the direction to enriching the models and improving
the scheme designs.
Supporting materials are organized as appendices:
 We briey present in Appendix A the primitives of similarity measurement which
are applicable to website ngerprint comparisons. Pseudocodes of the Wagner-
Fischer algorithm for the computation of Levenshitein's edit distance are presented
for reference.
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We present the background on VPN and Tor trac characteristics, and we review the current
development of trac source identication techniques, for further comparative analysis.
2.1 Overview
A trac source is identied by a unique IP address to facilitate network communication.
Yet IP address can be spoofed when response is not expected, such as in attack scenarios.
In particular, bots launching a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack usually spoof
their IP addresses to evade detection. A substantial amount of IP traceback schemes have
been proposed to trace the attack paths so as to uncover the bots.
IP addresses can also be obfuscated for condentiality of communication. Techniques
deployed in practice that may hide the communication endpoints include encryption with
proxy (SSH tunnel or SSL/TLS tunnel), and Tor.
We use side channel information of web trac which is revealed despite the use of
encrypted tunnel to identify the website user accesses. Web trac characteristics that are
observed over encrypted tunnels enable the selection of eective side channel features. The
feature values of each website are treated as its ngerprint for identication. Feasibility
of website ngerprinting has been demonstrated in a number of schemes.
A related problem to website ngerprinting is on recovering web server identities from
anonymized trac log. However, the problem we address is dierent from it in two
aspects. (i) It identies websites from a collection of access logs where ow statistics
are preserved, while we identify based on each web access. (ii) It analyzes trac log
of anonymized but not encrypted data, in which most features of individual connections
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are observable, including start time and end time, amount of data transmitted. Similar
data are not available from encrypted and proxied communication. We are not studying
this problem in further details in this thesis, but existing techniques to anonymize or
deanonymize trac logs are surveyed.
Tor is the most trusted and most widely used in servicing anonymous communication.
It is a realization of mix network, but it removes the operation that batches packets,
in order to have low latency in supporting interactive applications, e.g. web browsing
and VoIP. Yet Tor operates under a controversial security model, which assumes limited
capability of adversaries who can only make non-global observations and control a fraction
of Tor nodes. Even under Tor's somewhat restricted threat model, various passive and
active attacks have been proposed to correlate trac across Tor nodes. Most notably
are trac conrmation attacks where a unique watermark is embedded into the timing
channel to conrm a suspected communication relationship.
This chapter is organized as follows. Web trac characteristics observed over VPN
is discussed in Section 2.2. Tor architecture and its security model are described in
Section 2.3. These two sections provide backgrounds on trac patterns for analysis,
then we present in the subsequent sections existing trac source identication schemes
under dierent trac models. Techniques to trace DDoS attack paths are categorized
in Section 2.4. Website ngerprinting and ow watermarking schemes are compared
in Section 2.5. Attacks that break the anonymity of Tor are classied in Section 2.6.
Techniques to anonymize or deanonymize trac logs are surveyed in Section 2.7. Finally
Section 2.8 summarizes this chapter.
2.2 Web Trac Behavior over VPN
Webpage contents are retrieved from the web server using HTTP and presented by the
client browser. SSL or its successor TLS provides a layer of protection to data secrecy
by encrypting the HTTP trac before transmitting them over TCP/IP. VPN provides
an SSL tunnel such that the server address is encapsulated into the packet payload and
encrypted.
We nd two important characteristics of web trac over VPN by observing tunneled
and encrypted HTTP streams. By an HTTP stream, we mean the stream of packets sent
and received for a web access. The observations we make are: (i) webpage download by
HTTP is highly structured; and (ii) encryption and proxy do not severely alter the packet
sizes, nor the packet ordering. Although our discussions are based on VPN, the trac
patterns generally apply to other low latency SSH or SSL/TLS encrypted tunnels. The
observations help us to infer the consistent website features for ngerprint. The protocol
properties related to our feature selection are discussed in this section.
2.2 Web Trac Behavior over VPN 15
Figure 2.1: Communication between browser and server. ACKs to data packets are omitted
for clarity.
HTTP Stream
Here we argue that the layout of webpages changes only infrequently, and because of the
regular behavior of HTTP and browser, the object requests and responses of a webpage
have consistent order and sizes.
Websites with dynamic contents are usually generated based on design templates.
Their layout does not often change, because redesigning the template requires manual
work, which is time consuming and costly. Although the referenced embedded objects
can change, their sizes tend to vary within a range. Websites that do not rely on templates
only update infrequently.
HTTP has regular behavior in webpage loading, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Client
browser downloads the base object of a webpage, which is usually an HTML le, and
parses it. The parsing can be done while the base object is still downloading. When it
encounters a reference to an embedded object, such as graphics or stylesheets, it issues an
HTTP request to fetch it. Since web servers are required to serve HTTP requests in a
rst-come-rst-serve manner [28], the order of the response data is correlated to the order
of the requests.
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HTTP chunked encoding is widely used. It modies an HTTP message body to
transfer it in a series of chunks, so as to allow clients to display the data immediately after
receiving the rst chunk. It is especially useful when the message is dynamically generated
with several components, the server need not wait to calculate the total Content-Length
before it starts transmitting the data. For example, a large graphics le is compressed
and transferred by pixel blocks. If chunked encoding is not supported, then all packets
of an object response have sizes equal to the path MTU, except for the last one which
sends the remaining data. Otherwise, an HTTP response can contain several packets of
sizes not equal to the path MTU, which are the last packets of data chunks. These packet
sizes are characteristic and their order is in sequence of the object data.
To speed up the presentation of a webpage, (i) multiple TCP connections are opened
to download several objects in parallel, (ii) on each connection, HTTP requests can
be pipelined, meaning a client is allowed to make multiple requests without waiting for
each response. Because of multiple TCP connections and HTTP pipelining, data packets
belonging to dierent embedded objects can interleave, thus object sizes cannot be deter-
mined by accumulating the amount of data received between adjacent HTTP requests.
Multiple TCP connections and HTTP pipelining are the main sources of variation in
the otherwise consistent order of object requests and responses. In addition, the order
of objects may be browser specic, and the dynamics in network condition causes some
random noise.
There are a few causes to the slight variation of an object size in transmission. An
HTTP response message contains zero to more optional headers, while the default is
associated with the object type and the browser. Certain types of objects are always
compressed during transmission for eciency, e.g. multimedia contents. The default
compression algorithm is browser specic, though it can be negotiated between the server
and browser. Hence the length of the optional headers and the size of a compressed object
are consistent for each object and browser, with slight variation across browsers.
SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0
SSL [31] or TLS [6, 41] protects data secrecy of HTTP messages by encryption and data
integrity by hashing. Long HTTP messages are fragmented to be sent in multiple SS-
L/TLS records. The record length approximately preserves the HTTP message fragment
length, but appended with a message authentication code and padded for encryption. De-
pending on the HMAC-cipher suite negotiated, the SSL/TLS record length is increased by
16 to 28 bytes from the message fragment. Part of a record and/or several short records
can be packed into one packet, bounded by the path MTU, but each record is required to
be ushed. The length of each SSL/TLS record can be observed from the record header.
When the packet payload is not available, the packet length can be taken as an estimate
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of the record length, though it may represent the total length of several SSL records and
is less accurate.
In SSL 3.0, the padding added prior to encryption is the minimum amount required to
make the message length a multiple of the cipher's block size. In contrast, TLS 1.0 denes
random padding in which the padding can be any amount up to 255 bytes that results
in a multiple of the cipher's block size. However, it is reported that random padding is
not implemented in browsers [88]. Our research reiterates that the random padding to
packets should be enforced to thwart trac analysis based on message sizes.
OpenVPN
The data authenticity, condentiality and integrity provided by OpenVPN [60] is based
on SSL/TLS. It encrypts both the data and control channels using the OpenSSL library.
By comparing the packets in plaintext and ciphertext, we nd that the increase in packet
sizes is consistent at about 100 bytes.
The OpenVPN server also acts as a proxy for web clients, deploying the IPSec ESP
protocol for packet tunneling. All the TCP/UDP communications between a client and
the VPN server are multiplexed over a single port. This prevents revealing the number
of TCP connections opened or the number of objects in a webpage.
2.3 Tor's Architecture and Threat Model
Tor [81] is the second generation Onion Router that was initially sponsored by the US
Naval Research Laboratory. The principle of Tor is mix network [14], but Tor sacrices
some security for reducing the latency and bandwidth overhead.
Several email anonymization systems were built based on mixes, notably Babel [37],
Mixmaster [61, 54] and its successor Mixminion [23]. The latency of these systems is
tolerable for email, but not suitable for interactive applications. Some mix based systems
were developed to carry low latency trac, notably ISDN mix [64] anonymizes phone
conversations, and Java Anonymous Proxy (JAP) [9] anonymizes web trac. ISDN mix
was designed for circuit switched network where all participants transmit at a continuous
and equal data rate, whereas Tor supports the more dynamic packet switched Internet
in anonymizing TCP streams. Trac owing through JAP goes through several nodes
arranged in a xed cascade, while Tor allows path selection and is more versatile than JAP
by supporting hidden services. There are a list of commercially deployed anonymizing
networks, including findnot.com and anonymizer.com. Yet Anonymizer is a single hop
proxy.
The mix based design makes Tor trusted and popular as a real anonymous communi-




The concept of using \Mixes" to provide anonymous communication was introduced by
Chaum in 1981 [14]. Each mix node acts as a relay that hides the correspondence between
its input and output messages. Mix system provides most promising balance between
anonymity and eciency in terms of bandwidth, latency and computation overheads.
A mix has three essential functions, namely, providing bitwise unlinkability, batching
messages, and generating dummy trac. Unlinkabililty breaks the association in bit
patterns of incoming and outgoing messages of a mix. To achieve unlinkability, messages
are divided into blocks and incrementally encrypted with the chain of mixes' public keys.
Upon receiving a message, a mix decrypts the message, strips o the next relay's address
contained in the plaintext block, then appends a random block to keep the message size
invariant. A mix buers a number of messages to process in a batch. The messages are
reordered before being sent out. Batching makes tracing based on time or the ordering
of messages dicult. Dummy trac covers the genuine messages amidst noise. Dummy
messages can be created by message senders or mixes alike.
Tor Architecture
An anonymous communication channel via Tor ows through a circuit, which is a path
composed of (by default) three randomly selected Tor routers that connects from the
client proxy to the desired destination. The rst node is called the entry node or entry
guard, and the last node is called the exit node. Entry guard is chosen preferentially
among high uptime and high bandwidth Tor routers.
Tor routers are responsible for obscuring from observers the correspondence between
their incoming and outgoing data streams. Data of TCP streams are divided into cells
each of 512 bytes and wrapped in layered encryptions to maintain unlinkability. Each
hop on the circuit removes a layer of encryption till a cell is fully decrypted at the exit
node, where cells are reassembled into TCP packets and forwarded to the user's intended
destination. This process is known as onion routing [34].
Tor does not perform any batching of messages or generating any dummy trac,
because of concerns on latency and bandwidth eciency. When TCP data are packaged
into cells, the data are padded if there are less than 512 bytes. This reduces the latency in
data buering and facilitates interactive procotols, such as SSH that sends short keystroke
messages. Unlike email mixes, Tor does not intentionally introduce any delay. Its typical
latencies are in the range of 10-100 ms [55].
Every Tor circuit has a maximum lifetime, to prevent anonymity being compromised
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due to using the same circuit for a long time. The maximum lifetime of a circuit is
congurable and it is 10 mins by default. After maximum lifetime expires, idle circuits
are torn down and replacements are set up.
Threat Model
Security researches often assume a powerful adversary to guarantee systems that protect
against it are secure in real world conditions. A powerful adversary to anonymous commu-
nication would arguably be able to monitor all network links, to inject, delete or modify
messages along any links, and to compromise a subset of network nodes. Tor assumes a
weaker adversary.
Tor has a security model commonly used by low latency anonymous systems, e.g.
Freenet [18], MorphMix [66] and Tarzan [30]. It protects against a non-global adversary
who can observe and control only a portion of the network, and can inject, drop or alter
trac only along certain links. Given any mix could be compromised, each Tor circuit
contains a chain of mixes so that if at least one mix in the chain is not malicious, some
anonymity is provided. Tor entry node knows the user IP, while the exit node knows the
destination, but no one single Tor node knows both ends of a communication.
Tor does not protect against a global passive adversary. For quality of service concerns,
Tor has not explicitly altered the delay of packets nor hidden the trac volume by adding
dummy trac. Hence, it cannot break the correlation of trac by timing or volume. The
class of statistical disclosure attacks correlate the timing of inbound and outbound trac
among all nodes the adversary monitors to determine long term communication patterns.
Tor is also vulnerable to trac conrmation attacks, where an adversary monitors the
trac at two suspected parties to validate if they are communicating with each other.
We propose an active website ngerprinting attack under Tor's security model. Our
approach does not require a global adversary, nor controlling links at both ends of a
communication. It only assumes the Tor entry node (or a router between the user and
the Tor entry node) is compromised so as to observe and delay certain packets.
2.4 DDoS Packet Marking Schemes
Existing DDoS traceback schemes can be classied into two categories. (i) Routers are
queried on the trac they have forwarded. The routers may not need to log packets.
(ii) The receiver locally reconstructs the attack paths from a collection of packets. Each
packet carries partial path information. The packets are either probabilistically marked
by routers or specially generated for traceback. The rst category includes online query
and variations of hash based logging schemes [73, 49]. The second category includes
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variants of probabilistic packet marking (PPM) [69], ICMP traceback (iTrace) [8], and
algebraic encoding [24].
Probabilistic Packet Marking Schemes
In iTrace [8], routers sample packets with a small probability. A sampled packet is du-
plicated in an ICMP packet, plus information of the router's upstream or downstream
neighbor forming an edge with itself. Based on the ICMP packets, the victim reconstructs
the attack paths by linking up the edges. Note that routers farther away generates fewer
iTrace packets to the victim. A variant of iTrace, called intention-driven iTrace [51],
introduces an intension indicator to inform remote routers to raise their probability in
generating iTrace packets.
Instead of adding network trac, PPM (probabilistic packet marking) probabilistically
embeds partial path information into packets. Savage et al. [69] proposed the Fragment
Marking Scheme (FMS). Two adjacent routers, forming an edge, randomly insert their
information into the packet ID eld. The path information thus spreads over multiple
packets for reassembly. However, for multiple attack paths, the computation overhead of
path reconstruction is high, due to explosive combinations of edge connections. Subse-
quent proposals: Advanced and Authenticated Marking Schemes (AMS) [74], Randomize-
and-Link (RnL) [35], and Fast Internet Traceback (FIT) [93] improve the scalability and
the accuracy of traceback. Dean et al. [24] adopted an algebraic approach for traceback,
by encoding path information as points on polynomials. The algebraic technique requires
few marked packets per path for reconstruction. However, the processing delay on the
marked packets can be large if a long sequence of routers performs marking. On the other
hand, if short sequences of routers perform marking, the reconstruction overhead will be
large due to combinatorial search. The scheme does not scale for multiple attackers.
2.5 Website Fingerprinting and FlowWatermarking Schemes
Packet marks are embedded into unencrypted packet headers for inspection. Whereas
when packet headers are encapsulated into the packet payload and encryption is applied,
we turn to the side channels of trac ows to extract identifying information about trac
sources.
Side channel information has protted a wide range of trac analysis applications. For
example, keystroke intervals are used for password guessing over SSH [75]; the sequence
of bit rates is used to identify the streaming video encoded with variable bit rate schemes
[68]; packet sizes and packet rates are used to reveal the presence of Skype trac [12];
packet size, timing and direction are used to infer the application layer protocol [91].
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In chapters 6 and 8, we use side channel information to identify websites accessed
through low latency encrypted tunnels. Both website ngerprinting and ow watermark-
ing techniques work on similar trac models.
Existing website ngerprinting schemes are passive in the sense that they merely
observe HTTP stream patterns. Most of them exploit packet size related features to
generate ngerprint of a website, which is compared with website ngerprint proles for
identication. It is dicult to apply packet size based ngerprinting schemes on Tor, as
Tor transmits data in multiples of a cell. We propose an active website ngerprinting
model in Chapter 8 with evaluation on Tor.
Flow marking techniques do not require trac themselves having rich identifying
information. Instead, they embed a transparent watermark on the timing channel of a ow
for trac source verication. In contrast to existing website ngerprinting schemes, ow
watermarking are active and applicable on Tor. Flow watermarking techniques require
some control at both ends of a communication, while website ngerprinting only need
some control at the user end to infer the visited remote website.
We review in this section the existing website ngerprinting schemes and countermea-
sures, as well as the ow watermarking schemes.
Website Fingerprinting Schemes
Several works [40, 78, 10, 50, 39] looked at the issue of using trac analysis to identify
websites accessed through certain encrypted tunnels, such as SSH tunnel or VPN. How-
ever, some of their assumptions have been invalidated with the changes in HTTP and
web browser behaviors. For example, browsers were assumed not to reuse a TCP con-
nection to download multiple embedded objects [40], and object requests were assumed
non-pipelined [78]. Hence their approaches to determine an object size by accumulat-
ing the data received either through a TCP connection [40] or between adjacent HTTP
requests [78] no longer work.
While Hintz [40] and Sun et al. [78] used features on objects sizes for website nger-
prints, Bissias et al. [10], Liberatore et al. [50] and Herrmann et al. [39] used features
on packets. Bissias et al. [10] used the features on distributions of packet sizes and inter-
arrival times. It identied a website by nding the cross correlation between the test
ngerprint and the ngerprint proles. It obtained an accuracy of 23%, probably due to
packet inter-arrival times vary with network condition and server load. Liberatore et al.
[50] used the set composed of (direction, packet size) pairs as ngerprint, and applied Jac-
cards classier and Naive Bayes classier with kernel density estimation. Between which,
Jaccards classier gave better performance. It measures similarity as jX\Y jjX[Y j , where X and
Y are the sets representing a website prole and a test ngerprint, and jXj denotes the
size of set X. The scheme achieved an identication accuracy of 70% when examining
22 Background
2,000 websites. Herrmann et al. [39] operated on the packet size frequency vectors, using
Multinomial Naive Bayes (MNB) classier. The transformation to relative frequencies
yielded improved performance over Liberatore et al. [50]'s scheme. However, relying on
relative frequencies made it dicult to incrementally add website proles to the database,
because the modication aects the overall frequency distribution. The identication ac-
curacy is thus sensitive to the timeliness of website proles. Fingerprinting schemes based
on packet size related features [10, 50, 39] are not eective against Tor, as Tor transmits
messages in xed length cells. An attempt on Tor gave an accuracy of below 3% on
identifying 775 URLs [39]. These schemes only utilized side channel features related to
sizes but not ordering.
Coull et al. looked at a related problem which identies websites from anonymized
ow logs [20]. The scheme identies individual servers that supply embedded objects of
a webpage by applying kernel density estimation on the per ow size and the cumulative
size of ows. From the sequence in which servers are contacted, it identies the visited
webpage. However, the technique does not transport easily to identifying proxied and en-
crypted communication, because servers are not consistently mapped to their pseudonyms
and connection statistics are not preserved with proxy and encryption.
Countermeasures to Website Fingerprinting
Several variants of packet padding are proposed to defend against website ngerprinting.
Padding every packet to the size of path Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) can thwart
size related trac analysis, but the amount of overhead it causes is nearly 150% of the
actual data [50]. \Mice-elephant" packet padding incurs relatively less overhead, at nearly
50% growth in the data transmitted. It pads packets to two sizes, either a small size for
control packets, or to the path MTU for data packets. The large bandwidth overhead
they cost leads to insucient incentives for deployment.
Wright et al. [90] proposed trac morphing as a bandwidth ecient alternative to
packet padding. It transforms the source packet size distribution to mimic that of a target
website, by splitting or padding the packets, while minimizing the bandwidth overhead.
The morphing technique targets at ngerprinting schemes that only use information on
packet size distribution. It considers limited or no packet ordering information.
The approximate total size of a webpage is not concealed even if packets are padded
or the size distributions are changed. Dummy trac can be used to cover up this feature
if they are augmented indistinguishably from normal trac. Clearly, packet padding and
dummy trac trade o bandwidth eciency for anonymity.
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Flow Watermarking Schemes
Communications with encryption and anonymizing network are perceived by many as
both secure and anonymous. However, works by Wang et al. [87] and Yu et al. [94]
demonstrated that low latency anonymizing networks are susceptible to timing attacks,
and that watermarking techniques can be applied to UDP or TCP trac alike, to track
anonymous communications. Yet watermarks on multiple ows may interfere with one
another if they are transmitted over common links.
Wang et al. presented a watermarking scheme to conrm the communicating parties
of Skype VoIP calls [87]. Skype [80] encrypts data streams from end to end using 256-bit
AES, and it uses VPN provided by findnot.com [29] as its anonymizing technology. The
underlying peer-to-peer network of Skype is KaZaa [43], which transmits UDP messages.
The watermarking scheme embeds a distinctive bit sequence into an encrypted VoIP ow
by adjusting the interval of packets. The aected packets only need to be delayed by
several milliseconds for an embedded watermark to be preserved across the anonymizing
network, if sucient redundancy is applied. The watermarking scheme requires direct
control of a VoIP gateway located close to the caller.
Yu et al. proposed a ow watermarking technique based on Direct Sequence Spread
Spectrum (DSSS) and evaluated it on Tor [94]. The technique embeds a watermark of
pseudo-noise code by interfering with sender's trac. Using interference eliminates the
need to capture a ow for changing packet intervals, although the interferer needs to
share the physical link with the trac source. The delay between performing a trac
interference and when it is eected cannot be reliably predicted, due to the dynamic trac
rates of other ows on the link.
2.6 Attacks on Tor Anonymity
The main goal of attacks to Tor is to reveal the anonymous communication relationship, or
to discover hidden services protected by Tor. Based on the features they exploit, attacks
to Tor can be classied into attacks on circuit setup, attacks using timing information,
and attacks based on trac load.
Attack Targeting at Tor Circuit Setup
Bauer et al. proposed an attack that exploits Tor's preferential path selection strategy
which favors nodes with high bandwidth capabilities [7]. As the resource claims by nodes
are not veried, even a low resource adversary can make false claims and compromise a
high percentage of circuit building requests of Tor. Srivatsa et al. proposed an attack
that uses triangulation based timing analysis to infer the sender if the transmission route
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is set up by shortest path [76]. The attack potentially aects Tor because Tor has low
latency, but Tor circuit is not set up using shortest path.
Timing Analysis
Many attacks [9, 87, 94, 95, 42, 44, 22, 52, 4] target at Tor's low latency property. They
exploit timing related information to correlate ows or to conrm suspected sender and
receiver relationship.
Passive ow correlation attacks include works by Zhu et al. [95], Hopper et al. [42] and
the class of statistical disclosure attacks [9, 44, 22, 52]. The attack by Zhu et al. correlates
the output link to an input link of a mix given the mix batching strategy [95]. Long term
intersection attack [9] correlates times when senders and receivers are active. Disclosure
attack [44] and statistical disclosure attack [22, 52] monitor messages sent by a user and
messages received by a set of candidates in a series of intervals, so as to (statistically)
establish the likely communication preference. Hopper et al. provided a quantitative
analysis on the information leaked from network latency and network coordinate data [42].
It also mounted an attack for colluding websites to associate ows to the same initiator
based on the web servers' local timing information.
Active trac conrmation attacks [87, 94] perturb packet intervals to embed a unique
\watermark" at sender for detection at the receiver, so as to conrm a suspected commu-
nication relationship. Dierence between the attack schemes lies in their techniques to
embed a watermark. A watermark can be embedded by a compromised Tor entry node
[87], or through interference with the sender trac applying direct sequence spread spec-
trum technique [94]. The attack by Abbott et al. [4] tricks a client web browser (e.g. by
injecting JavaScript) into sending a distinctive signal which is logged with the help of the
malicious Tor exit node. When the entry node becomes some malicious node due to cir-
cuit replacement, the signal is linked to the user and hence compromising the anonymity
in web browsing. Yet interval based watermarking schemes, e.g. [94], are susceptible to
multi-ow attack [46]. The attack combines multiple watermarked ows to detect the
watermark presence, recover the secret parameters and remove the watermark.
Since the disclosure attacks and trac conrmation attacks require simultaneous con-
trol over the entry and exit link of the Tor circuit, some proposal suggests diversifying
the geographic location of Tor nodes selected for a connection [26]. Yet this does not
prevent attacks that decouple the compromise of entry and exit nodes, e.g. [4]. Adaptive
padding [86] is proposed to defend against both passive and active Tor trac analysis
which exploits timing. In adaptive padding, intermediate mixes inject dummy packets
into statistically unlikely gaps in the packet ow, to destroy the timing \ngerprints".
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Attacks Exploiting Trac Load
Some attacks [70, 32, 56] use trac load to correlate incoming and outgoing ows of a
Tor node, so as to reveal the Tor path and to associate ows from the same initiator.
Passive analysis [70] shows a connection can be traced through correlating the incoming
and outgoing packet counts of a mix in an interval, and the propagation of trac increase,
which indicates a connection start, is observable by the packet counter. Active attacks
[32, 56] are based on the observation that trac volume of one ow aects the latency
of other ows of a mix. Attacker injects packets and monitors the trac latency to infer
either the user trac rate or the Tor path of a ow. A related attack [55] eects by
causing server load variations, and remotely observes the clock skew through timestamps,
so as to discover hidden services.
The attack we propose is substantially dierent from the existing Tor attacks. Firstly,
existing attacks on Tor such as watermarking, active probing and disclosure attacks all
focus on the subtle dierences in packet timing or trac load when they infer trac route
or communicating parties. We are the rst in taking an active approach in utilizing inline
object size features as \ngerprints" to identify websites accessed in Tor. Secondly, most
end-to-end identication over Tor require some control over both the rst link and the
last link in the communication path. Whereas our model only requires controlling trac
on the entry link, the probability in fullling the attack condition is increased. Thirdly,
Tor is believed to prevent adversaries from uncovering a communication relationship if
adversaries have no ready suspects of the communicating pair. Yet our study will show
that even for an adversary with poor apriori suspicion among a large set of candidate
websites, anonymous web browsing can be identied with high accuracy.
2.7 Trac Log Anonymization and Deanonymization
Trac log anonymization has the objective of sanitizing sensitive data (e.g. hiding IP
addresses) to protect user and server anonymity in releasing trac log for research.
Many attacks target at, and improvements are proposed upon (partial) prex-preserving
anonymization [92, 62].
Anonymization Techniques
Tcpdpriv [53] is the most well known anonymization tool. It operates on tcpdump traces,
and provides dierent levels of restrictiveness in removing sensitive data, which includes
prex-preserving anonymization. Many tools wrap around tcpdpriv with slight extension,
e.g. ip2anonip [65] and ipsumdump [47].
Xu et al. proposed a prex-preserving IP address anonymization technique [92]. Pre-
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x preserving requires if two unanonymized IP addresses share a k-bit prex, so will their
anonymized counterparts. The technique by Xu et al. applies a stateless cryptography
algorithm, such that subnet structures are preserved and IP addresses are mapped consis-
tently across anonymization sessions. The technique is implemented in a software named
Crypto-PAn [83], and has been applied to anonymize Netow data [71].
Pang et al. proposed a partial prex-preserving anonymization system [62]. It guaran-
tees that two IPs in the same unanonymized subnet will also be in the same anonymized
subnet, but other prex relationships among IPs are not preserved. It uses a pseudo-
random permutation to anonymize subnet and host portions of IPs separately.
Koukis et al. designed a general framework that allows customized anonymization pol-
icy, including supports of application layer anonymization, such as to randomize the URL
eld of an HTTP request [48]. The framework is backed up by programming interfaces.
Deanonymization Attacks
King et al. presented a taxonomy of attacks to anonymized network log [45]. The tax-
onomy formalizes the attack pre-conditions into adversary knowledge set and adversarial
capabilities, such that using rst order predicate, they can express constraints of attack
construction. The resulting high level attack classication is identical to that given by
Slagell et al [72], which contains ve attack classes: ngerprinting, structure recognition,
known mapping attack, data injection and cryptographic attack.
Coull et al. proposed an attack feasible over NetFlow logs that deanonymizes servers
through behavioral proling [21]. It rst nds heavy hitters using normalized entropy.
If a few IP addresses occur much more frequently than others, the normalized entropy
of the addresses will be low. Then it develops behavioral proles of the heavy-hitters,
such as what services they oer. Finally pseudonyms of servers can be deanonymized by
comparing the behavioral proles and public information on server popularity. Coull et al.
[19] quantied the anonymity of a host by the entropy of probability distribution on the
object's possible identities. The work also analyzed conditional anonymity which showed
that the anonymity upon deanonymization of other hosts were signicantly reduced.
Ribeiro et al. presented an ecient host deanonymization attack targeting (partial)
prex-preserving anonymized traces [67]. It found that network structural constraints
led to IP disclosures. Ambiguous host identities were further disclosed by the optimal
match (minimum cost) in relabeling host addresses in the binary tree that represented the
network structure annotated with external information, e.g. host behaviors. Eectiveness
of the attack was partly dependant on the completeness and accuracy on the external
information. The work quantied in the worst case the amount of hosts deanonymized. It
showed that generally partial prex-preservation improved anonymity, but the sanitization
that randomized subnets only sacriced trace utility.
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Brekne et al. proposed an attack that employs packet injection and frequency anal-
ysis to compromise individual addresses protected by prex-preserving anonymization in
multilinear time [13]. They also suggested modications to strengthen the anonymization
methods, such as to release the topology information gradually.
2.8 Summary
We laid the background knowledge on web trac characteristics over low latency en-
crypted communication tunnels. We made two observations on VPN, SSH or TLS en-
crypted and proxied HTTP streams: (i) webpage download by HTTP is highly structured;
and (ii) encryption and proxy do not severely alter the packet sizes, nor the packet order-
ing. Tor protects anonymity by layered encryption and multiple proxies. It is a reduced
implementation of mix network, which sacrices batching of packets for reduced delay
to support interactive applications, and which eliminates dummy trac for bandwidth
eciency. Tor operates under a security model where adversaries are assumed to be able
to observe only a fraction of the Tor network and have control only on a fraction of the
Tor nodes. Under Tor's security model, anonymity may still be compromised by exploit-
ing Tor's low latency property or by correlating the trac load. As the size of Tor cells
is xed, it poses a signicant challenge to getting information about the underlying web
trac by the size channel. There is not yet any research on identifying websites over Tor
by features of web object sizes.
We reviewed techniques to track trac sources, including packet marking, website
ngerprinting and ow watermarking. Packet marks are embedded into unencrypted
packet headers for inspection. PPM (probabilistic packet marking) probabilistically em-
beds partial path information into packet headers. The path information thus spreads
over multiple packets for reassembly. Existing schemes designed packet marks with so-
phisticated structure, most of which reserve a few bits to indicate the hop count from
a marking router to the victim server. The dierences between various DDoS packet
marking schemes are subtle. There is not yet any metric for fair comparison across them
because of their dierences in model assumptions. As for website ngerprinting and ow
watermarking, they have some similarities as well as dierences. Both website nger-
printing and ow watermarking apply on encrypted and proxied communication channel.
Existing website ngerprinting schemes are passive, while ow watermarking schemes are
active. Existing website ngerprinting schemes use only side channel features related to
sizes, and hence cannot withstand the countermeasure of trac morphing. No website
ngerprinting schemes have used packet ordering information, neither do they apply to
Tor. Flow watermarking techniques are applicable to Tor, but they require monitoring
both ends of the communication. The trac analysis model of ow watermarking assumes
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candidates of a communication are available. Hence it veries a pairwise communication
relationship by embedding a watermark into the timing channel of the packet ow at one
end of the communication, and verifying the watermark at the other end.
Chapter 3
Framework of Trac Source
Identication
We lay out our framework of trac source identication, in which the domain of trac source
identication models is classied by the attributes of trac model or investigator capability, and
the criteria of scheme designs are discussed. The framework guides the construction of source
identication schemes with respect to given trac models.
3.1 Problem Statement
Trac source identication is the investigation of network trac so as to identify the
communicating parties. When trac obfuscation techniques are not used, trac source
can be easily identied from the IP addresses or message contents. However, when data
obfuscation techniques (such as IP spoong and data encryption) are used, it is no longer
trivial to identify trac source, and trac analysis techniques are needed.
Trac analysis is the process of monitoring the nature and behavior of trac, rather
than its content. We specify trac contents as the application data being transmitted, and
trac behavior as the side channel information, such as timing, size and data structures.
There are two main trac analysis approaches: active and passive. Passive analysis
is an approach that merely observes the trac in transmission to perform analysis. For
example, passive website ngerprinting proles and identies a website from an encrypted
and encapsulated HTTP stream, by using the observed side channel features from trac
as the website ngerprint. In contrast, active analysis is an approach that modies
the trac behavior for analysis. For example, the acitve ow watermarking technique
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embeds an identication bit sequence into the timing channel of a trac ow, and this
identication bit sequence serves as a watermark to reveal the trac source.
Our objective in this thesis is to study the relationship between trac models and
source identication approaches, and to design, evaluate and compare source identication
schemes. Our trac analysis for identifying trac sources is closely related to web surng.
The trac sources we are identifying can be web clients or web servers, depending on the
application scenarios. For DDoS attack against web server, we monitor the trac received
by the server to identify the attackers; while for encrypted and tunneled web surng, we
monitor the trac to identify the website being surfed by the client.
In this chapter, we present a taxonomy of trac identication techniques based on
the trac conditions and the capabilities of investigator. In Section 3.2 and Section 3.3,
we describe the components of a source identication model and the phases of operations
in a source identication scheme, respectively. Built on the dependencies among model
components, we present a decision tree based classication of trac source identication
models in Section 3.4. The classication shows the possible combinations of components
that lead to source identication models, and hence guides the development of source
identication schemes. We also describe in Section 3.4 three specic problem scenarios
and the corresponding source identication models that we investigate. In Section 3.5,
we examine the criteria for developing source identication schemes from models for the
three problem scenarios presented in Section 3.4.
3.2 Components of the Source Identication Model
We consider that a trac source identication model have the following four compo-
nents: obfuscation techniques being applied to the source trac, investigator's capability,
features utilized for trac source identication, and applications of the model. We sum-
marize the model components and their details in Table 3.1, and present each component
in detail in this section.
Obfuscation Techniques
Network trac source can be obfuscated through forging IP addresses, encryption together
with proxy, or pseudonymization, as described below.
With IP spoong, the source IP address in the packet header is a spoofed address
that is dierent from user's real IP. Forging of IP address in a packet header jeopardizes
subsequent communication, hence it appears only in attacks for repelling responses and
hiding attacker's identity. A forged IP can be a randomly generated bit sequence or an
existing IP address in a victim network which the attacker wants to direct the responses
to.
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Table 3.1: Components of Source Identication Models
Component Details
Obfuscation Technique (a) IP spoong
(b) Encryption together with proxy
(c) Pseudonymization




Exploited Feature (a) Timing
(b) Size
(c) Structure
Identication Application (a) Attack forensics
(b) Proling user interests
(c) Revealing network structure
   etc   
Encryption together with proxy creates an illusion that the communication endpoints
cannot be identied, as proxy enables encapsulation of endpoint addresses and encryption
protects condentiality of the encapsulated data from an observer. Encryption and proxy
are basis of many low-latency anonymous communication services, e.g. Anonymizer.com.
VPN, SSH tunnel and SSL/TLS tunnel are also based on encryption and proxy. VPN
multiplexes all connections between a source and destination pair into one.
Similar to IP spoong, pseudonymization changes the source IP addresses in packet
headers. Yet pseudonymization maps a trac source to a (private) IP or a pseudonym
usually consistently, and online communication with a pseudonymized trac source can
be supported. Pseudonymization is commonly used in sanitizing network packet traces
or ow logs, before they are released for cross-organization research. It covers up the
IP addresses and other sensitive data, while preserving the communication statistics.
Prex-preserving anonymization is currently the most recommended technique to per-
form pseudonymization. Pseudonyms are also used by servers to provide hidden services
through Tor. An important objective of psedonymization is to defend against mapping
of pseudonyms to individual hosts so as to protect privacy.
Tor provides by far the most reliable anonymous communication service. Tor net-
work is an implementation of Chaum's design of \mixes" [14], but some operations in
\mixes" are not included in Tor for eciency concerns. In \mixes", besides performing
layered encryption and using proxies, packets are repackaged into xed size packets, so
as to minimize the leakage of size related side channel information. In addition, pack-
ets are reordered to break the timing correlation, and dummy trac are introduced to
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cover noises. However, packet reordering and dummy trac are not implemented in Tor,
because packet reordering introduces considerable network delay, and dummy trac de-
grades the eective network throughput. Hence, layered encryption, multiple proxies and
unied packet sizes are the anonymity protection mechanisms that Tor relies on.
Investigator's Capability
Trac analysis can be carried out in a passive or active manner, constrained by the
capability of trac analysts. Passive analysis observes the trac, where the operation
is transparent to end users. It requires the least capability from a trac analyst. Active
analysis stimulates the trac or embeds marks into packets or ows. It is able to obtain
more information, but active analysis is not applicable to oine trac analysis.
In passive trac analysis, network communication are eavesdropped. Passive analysis
requires gaining accesses to the desired network segments. Pervasive wireless commu-
nication medium and widely distributed bots make it easier to satisfy the requirement.
Observation alone is sucient for many applications. Most obfuscation techniques leak
size or timing information, which renders them vulnerable to passive trac analysis. For
instance, encryption normally leaves message sizes unchanged.
As an approach to performing active trac analysis, trac stimulation changes the
packet or ow behavior to reveal features of the source data. For example, to trace the
attack paths of a ooding DDoS attack, controlled ooding exploits the fact that the
packet rate of one ow aects the packet rates of other ows sharing a network link.
Voluminous trac is iteratively launched in suspected network links, for the victim server
to determine if the network links are on attack paths. If a suspected network link is
indeed on an attack path, then some amount of the attack trac will be dropped during
transmission, as a result of controlled ooding. A similar model has been developed to
identify a Tor communication path, thus to link the otherwise unrelated ows to the same
requester. Investigators manipulate the ow rates at certain Tor nodes. If the latency
of a victim ow is found correlated to the manipulated trac rate, then they are likely
sharing (part of) a Tor circuit. These examples demonstrate that through stimulating
the trac rate, investigators are able to obtain additional information on the correlation
between the manipulated ow and the monitored ow, which can then be exploited to
uncover the communication path and identify trac sources.
As another approach of active trac analysis, mark embedment inserts marks into
packets or ows for identication. For instance, in ICMP traceback, routers generate
additional ICMP packets which duplicate part of the randomly sampled source ow pack-
ets and carry identifying marks of routers, for the purpose of tracking the source paths
under DDoS attacks. Marks can be embedded into the side channel of ows when packets
cannot be directly modied. Instead of changing some bits in packet headers, water-
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marks are embedded by modifying some ow characteristics, e.g. packet intervals. With
sucient redundancy, even slight perturbation on the timing of packets are observable
across a network connection [94]. For instance, watermark embedded at the VoIP caller
and extracted at the callee enables verication of the communication relationship by an
investigator.
Exploited Features
Features exploited to identify trac sources can either be extracted from the trac itself,
or injected by the investigator, and the choice of which is dependent on the underlying
trac model and investigator's capabilities.
Side channel features are related to trac behavior instead of packet content. The
side channel features exploited to perform trac analysis are generally size, timing and
structure related. These features can be properties of packets, le objects, or protocols.
Packet features are less stable than features of le objects, which in turn are less stable
than protocol features in general. The reasons lie in the dierent degrees of impact from
network noise and labor required to modify these features. However, more stable features
are harder to be extracted from obfuscated data. For example, to identify a webpage from
VPN traces, the packet size information is available, while inline object sizes are dicult
to extract because of interleaving object downloads, whereas structural information of
order of the contacted third-party servers is concealed by encryption.
Besides side channel features being extracted from the trac itself, features can also
be injected by investigators. For example, in DDoS traceback, packet marks often contain
router IPs and hop count from the marking router to the victim server. Sometimes they
also include partial packet content and timestamp. There is much exibility in designing
the injected marks to packets for source identication. In contrast, ow marks should
be designed to minimize interference, and hence has lower exibility, and the marks are
injected into and transmitted in the side channel of the trac.
The selection of feature is limited by the source data and investigator's capability. En-
cryption together with proxy does not intentionally alter the size or timing information,
yet not all features are observable after obfuscation, e.g. web object sizes. In comparison,
dummy trac, aggressive padding, and uniforming sizes intentionally reduce the distin-
guishability of size related features. Timing provides useful information in low latency
communications, including web browsing, VoIP. Note that timing information is usually
fuzzy, as it is aected by instant network conditions and the locality of data collection.
Most website ngerprinting attacks observe the quantity and length of data packets in-
curred by surng the website, but discard the timing information.
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Applications of Trac Source Identication
Trac analysis to identify trac sources or communication paths has a wide range of
applications, including attack forensics, building user proles, and identifying network
structures. Some of the applications are for the surveillance of online security, while others
demonstrate that the privacy protection provided by existing obfuscation techniques are
less reliable than we once thought.
Identifying DDoS attack sources is an example of forensic application. Another foren-
sic example is to identify the accomplice websites in XSS (cross site scripting) attacks,
which spread malicious codes to facilitate harmful activities, such as stealing private in-
formation from clients. Yet another forensic application is to verify a communication
relationship in lawsuits. Besides the content in communication, the communication rela-
tionship itself is also sensitive information.
Proles of user interests on web browsing can be built from either packet traces or
ow logs, by identifying the websites they visit, even if the source data are encrypted or
anonymized. Packet traces presents some packet features and possibly features of web
objects. Flow logs preserve features and statistics of ows and possibly object features,
too.
Identifying subnet structures and key servers of an organization provides useful in-
sights for the onset of an attack. Such information can be extracted from anonymized
ow logs using trac analysis techniques. It is a threat to business secrets and service
availability.
3.3 Phases of Operations
A trac source identication model in general contains two phases of operations, which
are data collection and data analysis.
Data collection refers to the processes of sampling network trac and extracting from
them the features desired for analysis. For instance, website ngerprinting attacks build
a database of website ngerprints and capture the victim HTTP streams in the data
collection phase. Note that it is not necessary to build website ngerprint proles before
the testing HTTP streams are captured. For active trac analysis, data collection also
includes the process of trac stimulation or mark injection. The medium that stores the
injected data can be packet headers or some side channels of packet ows.
Data analysis determines the trac sources from extracted features by comparing
the features with known source proles. A prole can be a distribution of packet marks
associated with a router, or a unique mark attached to a packet ow, or some side channel
features forming the trac ngerprint of a website. Data analysis may need to perform
fuzzy matching and evaluate the similarity between the proled and the extracted testing
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features, due to various noises. The sources of noise can be variations in the instant
network conditions, or dierence in the localities where the proling and testing trac
are collected.
3.4 Classication of Source Identication Models
We have presented in Section 3.2 the components of source identication models, here
we use the decision tree representation in Figure 3.1 to illustrate the classication of
source identication models by these components. Our framework is general enough that
existing trac source identication techniques are encompassed, and future techniques
can potentially be incorporated. It also assists in deriving new trac source identication
models.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the classication of trac source identication models. In the
top level, source identication models are classied by the source obfuscation techniques,
which can be (1) spoong IP addresses, (2) applying encryption together with proxy,
e.g. VPN or Tor, or (3) mapping source IP addresses to pseudonyms, such as in trac
log anonymization or protecting hidden servers. Under each type of source obfuscation,
analysts can develop passive or active source identication approaches depending on their
capability. The approaches include (1) eavesdropping the communication, (2) stimulating
the communication or (3) embedding marks into packets or ows. The source identica-
tion models can be classied in ner grain by the trac features they exploit.
Among the models shown in Figure 3.1, passive trac analysis is adopted by (a)
trac logging for DDoS traceback, (d) passive website ngerprinting, (e) statistical dis-
closure that identies long term communication probability over Tor, and (i) trac logs
deanonymization. Active approaches are taken by (b) controlled ooding and (c) packet
marking for IP traceback, (j) hidden service discovery over Tor, and (g) ow correlation
through stimulating the trac rate or (h) embedding watermarks. In addition, we pro-
pose (f) an active website ngerprinting model that stimulates HTTP trac to expose
additional features to identify websites.
Each path from root of the decision tree to a leaf node represents the combination
of components of a trac source identication model. For example, in the model of (b)
controlled ooding, the obfuscation technique used by attackers is (1) IP spoong, the
investigator is able to (1.2) modify the trac rate of certain ows, and monitor the feature
on the (1.2.1) trac rate correlation with the attack ows, so as to identify the attack
paths taken. For (h) ow watermarking, the model handles source obfuscation techniques
of (2) encryption and proxy, where the investigator (2.3) embeds some secret code as a
watermark in one end of the trac ow for verication across the anonymous network,
and the side channel feature selected to carry watermarks is (2.3.1) packet interval. We
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Figure 3.1: Classication of trac source identication techniques
(The dotted branch on models to identify pseudonymized trac sources is not our focus in this thesis)
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develop our model of (f) active website ngerprinting through forming novel combinations
of the component values. While all existing website ngerprinting approaches are passive,
we use (2.2) an active stimulation approach to obtain (2.2.1) inline web object features
so as to identify a website.
In this thesis, we investigate in detail three trac source identication models appli-
cable to dierent constraints and trac models, namely, packet marking, passive website
ngerprinting, and active website ngerprinting. The combination of their model compo-
nents are highlighted in Figure 3.1. Below we give an overview on the trac characteristics
of these applications and the corresponding source identication approaches we take. As
we are not looking into details of source identication models for pseudonymized trac,
the corresponding branch in the decision tree is faded.
Packet marking Packet marking applies when the source IP is spoofed and the packet
header is not encapsulated or encrypted. PPM (probabilistic packet marking) prob-
abilistically embeds partial path information into packet headers. The path infor-
mation thus spreads over multiple packets for reassembly. We assume routers are
cooperative in embedding packet marks and the packet stream for source identica-
tion contains suciently many packets. The scheme designed following this general
approach is presented in Chapter 5.
Passive Fingerprinting When the source packet headers are encapsulated into packet
payload and encryption is applied on the packet payload, packet marks embedded
into the source packet headers can no longer be inspected. We turn to the side
channels of trac ows to extract identifying information about trac sources.
Passive trac analysis is applicable to ngerprint websites when the HTTP streams
reveal sucient information about the sources.
Website ngerprinting aims to identify the website accessed through some encrypted
tunnels. Website \ngerprints" are proled on side channel features observed from
the HTTP streams, where an HTTP stream is a stream of packets sent and received
because of accessing a website. Existing website ngerprinting schemes target size
related features, relying on the fact that encryption does not obfuscate the amount
of data transmitted. Our passive website ngerprinting scheme exploits packet
ordering information in addition to the usual size related information. It is described
in Chapter 6.
Active Fingerprinting Existing website ngerprinting models are passive such that the
investigator does not modify the trac but only eavesdrops. However, when the
web browsing trac is not only encrypted and sent through proxies, but also the
data transmission unit is xed, the packet level characteristics are largely concealed.
38 Framework of Trac Source Identication
Hence passive ngerprinting may not be sucient to identify a source website, given
the obfuscation techniques of encryption, proxy and uniform data transmission unit,
such as in Tor.
We propose an active website ngerprinting model for the above trac model, in
which the investigator is capable of modifying the trac behavior to expose object
level characteristics of the source. In contrast to packet marking or ow watermark-
ing which embeds selected marks into a packet ow, the features monitored in active
ngerprinting originate from the source.
In the active ngerprinting scheme we develop, the selected features to website
ngerprinting are web object sizes and order. Interleaved data transmission of
several objects makes it dicult to extract the selected features. We delay the
HTTP requests so as to reveal the inline object sizes and order of the source website.
Our active website ngerprinting scheme is presented in Chapter 8.
3.5 Source Identication Scheme Design Criteria
In the previous section, we described three specic problem scenarios and the correspond-
ing source identication models. In this section, we examine the criteria for developing
concrete source identication schemes from these models. There are a number of technical
designs being involved, which include packet mark design in DDoS traceback, ngerprint
feature selection, and ngerprint similarity comparison in website ngerprinting.
Packet Mark Design Criteria
Packet marking schemes have a constraint that there are only limited number of bits
available (typically 16 bits) in the packet header for marking. The number of routers or
sources we need to identify exceeds the number of unique values the limited number of
bits can represent. As we need to identify each individual router and collisions of packet
marks cannot be avoided, each router is associated with a distribution of packet marks.
The packet marks should be designed such that it is easy to identify the contribut-
ing markers accurately and eciently from a combination of packet mark distributions.
Packet marks should be designed to minimize collisions, which translates to minimizing
the collisions in packet mark distributions from dierent markers. Further analysis and
evaluation on the design of packet marks are presented in Chapter 4.
Fingerprint Feature Selection Criteria
The essential criteria for selecting ngerprint features are ngerprint consistency and
distinguishability. Consistency provides the basis for comparison between a ngerprint
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and its prole, while distinguishability provides contrast between a ngerprint and the
proles of others.
Consistency means the ngerprints of the same trac source sampled at dierent
time, at dierent network locations, and at dierent trac rate of other ows sharing
the communication path are suciently close. It ensures the testing ngerprints are com-
parable to their proles. It is easy to understand that the intersection of feature values
from dierent ngerprints satisfy consistency. However, as the sample size increases and
multiple settings are considered, the number of exact matches in feature values reduces.
The extreme is null intersection, which means there is no feature value left in the nger-
print. We need more exible methods that tolerate some inconsistency in the selected
feature values when developing a source ngerprint prole. The consistency of feature
values is dependant on the trac characteristics. For instance, if packets are padded with
a randomized amount of bytes each time, then packet sizes are not consistent and hence
not suitable to be ngerprint features.
Distinguishability requires the ngerprints of a trac source be distinguishable from
ngerprints of others. The less expected feature values among all ngerprints give more
identifying information. We note that sometimes feature values may be not very inconsis-
tent but if they provide additional distinguishability of ngerprints, the features should
be selected. For example, in website ngerprinting, the embedded object sizes expose lots
of information of the webpage, most of which enables the source identication. Although
they are less consistent compared to the request sizes due to possibly object updates, the
feature on object sizes should be selected.
It is desirable that only a small sample is needed to build a stable prole and the
time to build a prole be short. In applications like website identication, long sample
collection and proling time reduces the identication accuracy because website contents
can be updated during the data processing.
Similarity Measurement Criteria
Certain prior knowledge of the trac sources are required for identication, which are in
the form of their associated packet marks, ow marks, or ngerprints. During testing,
we extract feature values from the trac and evaluate their similarity with proles of
candidate sources. There are three main criteria of similarity measurement.
Firstly, the dependency and relationship of feature values should be captured in the
comparison. In the website ngerprinting schemes we propose, we nd the ordering
information of featured packets or of HTTP object sizes adds valuable information to
website identication. If we employ SVM, Jaccard's coecient or Bayes network for
ngerprint comparison, then the ordering information would be lost.
Secondly, the accumulation of errors from misjudgement should be minimized. In the
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analysis of a large amount of data, one may attempt an iterative process that isolates a
group of related data to make a judgement on them, then remove these data from the
total collection before repeating the process of data isolation and judgement. However,
due to the ambiguity in the grouping of data, e.g. collisions of packet marks associated
with dierent routers, the removal of data in some previous iterations aects the accuracy
of judgement in the later iterations. The iterative approach is applicable if the grouping
of data is certain. Otherwise, from the point of accuracy, it is desirable to always analyze
the data from the total collection.
Lastly, it is desirable that the similarity measurement method be both memory and
computation ecient. We would like to locate the attack sources the soonest we can,
in order to deploy remedy policies and to catch the suspects in time. The comparison
method should be ecient enough to scale well with the number of potential trac sources.
Specially, it is desirable that the time and memory used to identify a trac source be
linear to the number of proles.
Scheme Evaluation Criteria
Eectiveness is the ultimate evaluation criterion of a trac source identication scheme.
Currently, it is quantitatively measured using identication accuracy in a classication
problem; and it is evaluated using false positive rate (FPR) and false negative rate (FNR)
in a detection problem. However, these metrics of identication accuracy, FPR and FNR
are sensitive to the dataset used for evaluation. Better numerical results in one dataset
may not represent a superior performance in another. It leaves the relative quality of
dierent schemes indeterministic. Fair comparison on the quality of packet marks, ow
marks or source ngerprints may require better evaluation metrics.
3.6 Summary
We present a framework of trac source identication models. The framework considers
each source identication model has components of obfuscation techniques, investigator's
capabilities, features, and applications. The model components aect one another. User
applications specify the privacy requirement and the data obfuscation method. Whereas
data obfuscation method inspires the trac monitoring approach as well as the selection of
features for analysis in a trac source identication application. The framework captures
that generally a trac source identication scheme contains data collection and analysis
these two phases of operations.
Trac source identication models are classied in the framework by their compo-
nents. The models to apply in dierent problem scenarios are dependent on the obfusca-
tion techniques and investigator's ability. We can opt for modifying the packet headers
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to embed marks, if the packet header is not encapsulated or encrypted. We can also
opt for performing passive or active trac analysis on the side channel characteristics
of the exchanged packets between a pair of communication endpoints, where the usual
side channel features utilized are packet sizes and intervals. Passive analysis suces if
substantial side channel features are observable, otherwise active analysis techniques are
required to expose additional information.
Under the framework, we highlight the source identication models that we investi-
gate, and examine the criteria in designing the source identication schemes, in problem
scenarios of DDoS traceback, passive website ngerprinting over VPN and active website
ngerprinting over Tor.
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Chapter 4
A General Probabilistic Packet
Marking Model
We consider a trac model of DDoS ooding attacks with IP spoong. We present a general packet
marking model of DDoS traceback schemes that captures and compares their common phases of
operations, namely, packet marking and path reconstruction. We propose using entropy as a fair
evaluation metric of packet marks quality across the schemes to predict the traceback accuracy.
4.1 Overview
In Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, many compromised hosts ood the
victim with an overwhelming amount of trac. The victim's resources are exhausted
and services to users become unavailable. DDoS attacks paralyzed high-prole web sites,
including Yahoo, CNN, Amazon and Microsoft, for hours to days [33]. DDoS attacks were
launched against and brought down several root DNS servers, lasting for hours [2].
During a DDoS attack, attack nodes often perform address spoong to avoid detec-
tion. An IP traceback mechanism aims to overcome address spoong and uncover the
attack paths or sources. While traceback is motivated by DDoS attacks, it also benets
analysis of legitimate trac. Potential applications of traceback include trac accounting
and network bottleneck identication. In Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM), routers
probabilistically mark the packets they transmit, so that the victim can trace the attack
paths up to their sources, based on the packets it received [69]. A packet is marked by
writing to the reusable bits in the IP header. We call the strings written as tags.
In this chapter, we present a general model for PPM schemes by formulating it as an
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identication problem, in which each node (or edge) marks packets probabilistically ac-
cording to an associated distribution of tags. Based on a collection of received packets, the
victim attempts to recover the markers' identities. Since there are multiple markers, this
collection is made up of samples from a mixture of the markers' associated distributions.
Hence, traceback is essentially identication of each individual distribution contributing
to the mixture. By viewing each distribution as a point in a high dimensional space,
we can see that this model is closely related to the studies of collusion-resistant codes
and ngerprinting [17, 82]. Thus, one may choose a known collusion-resistant code to
assign codewords to dierent markers. The main dierence between traceback and other
applications of collusion-resistant ngerprinting is the scale of the problem. The number
of markers can be more than a thousand, which is much larger than typical applications
of collusion-resistant ngerprinting.
4.2 Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM) Model
4.2.1 Problem Formulation
During a DDoS attack, a victim V receives an overwhelming amount of packets transmit-
ted over multiple paths, each at a packet rate greater than Ratt. A router along an attack
path can embed information of its identity into the packet headers. We call such router a
marker. Alternatively, the router can embed information of its identity and the next hop
identity into the header. In this case, we treat the edge as the marker. Let U be the set
of all possible markers, and M be the set of markers along the attack paths. Our goal
is to identify M among U . Let m = jMj, and n = jUj. Each marker is allowed to mark
L bits in a packet header1. The PPM problem is interesting when 2L is smaller than n.
The problem thus becomes how to use multiple L-bit tags to identify elements of M.
We measure the performance of a marking scheme by the false negatives ratio , which
is ratio of the number of markers not correctly identied over m, and the false positives
ratio , which is the ratio of the number of markers wrongly declared as on attack paths
over m.
4.2.2 Components of PPM
The operations of a PPM traceback scheme can generally be divided into the following
components: marking of packets by the routers, choice of tags used and reconstruction
using information from marked packets by the victim. In the following, for each of these
components, we rst present the general idea and then highlight the design of RPM.
1Typically, as indicated in [69, 74, 24, 35, 93], the 16-bit packet identication eld in the IP header
is used. The packet identication eld is used in less than 0.25% of the time to re-assemble fragmented
packets [77].
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Marking by Routers
In our model, each marker is associated with a distribution D on the L-bit tags. Such
associations are pre-assigned and xed throughout the marking and identication process.
Consider a marker with identity i and its assigned distribution Di. When it receives a
packet, the marker chooses with probability , an L-bit tag s according to the distribution
Di and mark the packet with s.
The probability  is a parameter that is the same for every marker. It is possible that
some packets arrive at the victim without being marked. We assume that the bits in
those unmarked packets are random and are uniformly distributed.
Since the marking process needs to be very ecient, sampling from the distribution
Di must be a simple operation. Thus, in RPM and other related work, only uniform
distribution on a nite set is considered. Essentially, the marker just randomly and
uniformly picks a tag s from a pre-assigned set. Let us write the probability density
function of the distributions assigned to the marker with identity i as Di. That is, Di(x)
is the probability that the tag x appears in a packet marked by i. Since we assume that
the distribution is uniform on a nite set of tags, Di(x) = 0 or c for some constants.
Thus, WLOG, we can also represent Di as a subset of L-bit tags. Let us write this set as
Xi where x 2 Xi i Di(x) > 0.
Choice of Marking
Consider a set of markers P . The collection of tags received by the victim follows a distri-
bution which is a mixture of the distribution associated to the markers in P . Deriving the
mixture distribution DP from P is not straightforward due to the eect of the probability
. Suppose that the only markers are P = fi1; i2g, where i1, i2 are along the same path
and i1 is nearer to the victim, then
DP (x) = Di1(x) + (  2)Di2(x) + (1  2+ 2)2 L
for every tag x.
Consider two sets of markers, P and Q. Let DP and DQ be the distribution of the
tags received from P and Q respectively. If DP = DQ then the victim is unable to
distinguish whether the samples is from P or Q. If DP is close to, but dierent from DQ,
an unreasonable large number of packets may be required to distinguish them. Hence, as
an approximation, we take the mixture distribution of DP as:
DP (x)  
X
i2P
Di(x); for all x






Dj(x); for all x
then it is dicult to distinguish packets from P and Q. In such case, we say that a
collision has occurred.
In general, the associatedDi should be chosen so as to minimize collisions, for example,
using a collision-resistant code. However, due to the size of the problem, RPM employs
random codes as it is more practical. For each marker i, the Di is generated from a
random function (for example, SHA) with i as input. We will show in later section that
use of random codes provides suciently good results.
Note that given the network topology, certain sets of markers are more likely to appear
compare to others. Ideally, the Di can be chosen by considering the network topology
to avoid collisions. However, in practice, individual marker lacks the global topology
information. Hence, a reasonable approach, as used in RPM, is to assign the Di randomly.
Reconstruction Algorithm
Due to the large problem size, a PPM scheme needs to address both the choice of Di
and the identication algorithm at the same time. Enforcing certain relationship among
the tags in Di for each i can aid identication. For example, in RnL [35], all tags from
a marker contain the same \cord". That is, a substring (the cord) of every tag from a
marker is the same. An example given by [35] invests 15 bits for the cord when L = 25.
Based on the cord, the received packets can be easily divided into smaller groups. Next,
packets in dierent groups are identied independently. Since the number of packets in
each group is smaller than the total number of packets, the task of identication become
easier.
RPM does not exploit special structure in the tags for reconstruction. Instead, it
assumes prior knowledge of neighborhood nodes and uses a hop-by-hop reconstruction.
Such assumption is also made in FMS, AMS, and FIT.
Marking Structures of Existing Schemes
Existing schemes often divide the L-bit tags into multiple components to include struc-
tures that contains path information or aid reconstruction. If the number of unique tags
generated by a marker is h, i.e. jXij = h, there is a dlog2 he-bit component which labels
the tags. Let us call it the hash index. For example, if jXij = 2, then the hash index
starts from 00, 01, 10 to 11. In addition, there is a component that is determined from
the hash index and the marker's identity. Let us call this the hash value. A few schemes,


























Figure 4.1: Path Length Distribution
bits for the hash index, and employ dierent hash functions to compute the hash value.
RnL [35] also reserves some bits for the hash index and the hash value.
4.3 Analysis
4.3.1 Entropy of Packet Marks
One measure of the quality of a chosen Di is the entropy of the mixture of distributions re-
ceived by the victim. Intuitively, uniformly random packet marks deliver highest entropy.
Higher entropy carries more bits of information, which can reduce the false negatives
ratio  and the false positives ratio . Entropy measure provides a means to evaluate
the performance of PPM schemes. A good marking scheme should strive to achieve high
entropy packet marks.
Some existing schemes trade o some entropy in the tags for easy path reconstruc-
tion; but they underperform in eectiveness. In particular, we will show that the use of
hop count to indicate distance from markers to the victim results in lower entropy than
uniformly random bits.
The design of FMS, AMS and FIT are very similar. They allocate 8 or 13 bits for
hash value, 2-3 bits to indicate the hash index, and 5-6 bits to keep the hop count from
the marker to the server. AMS slightly improves over FMS on the traceback accuracy
because it uses a better hash function. FIT in turn outperforms AMS by reducing hash
collisions. It introduces longer hash outputs, and encodes node information instead of
edge, since there are fewer nodes than edges. However, for FIT, L = 21 instead of 16. It


























Figure 4.2: Distribution of Distance Values from Packet Marks
updates 5 bits of the Time-To-Live (TTL) eld, besides marking over the 16-bit packet
ID eld. This changes the semantics of TTL. For instance, an intermediate router can
now prolong the lifetime of a packet by enlarging its TTL value.
FMS and AMS utilize 5 bits of distance information to aid in the hop-by-hop path
reconstruction. The entropy of such distance information is low, resulting in inecient
use of the marking bits. The reasons are two-fold. First, as shown in Figure 4.1, the
path lengths between any router and a server are averaged at around 16 hops. This result
is obtained using the topology with 225,415 edges and derived from Internet mapping
project. While 5 bits can represent a distance of up to 31 hops, the upper half of the
distance (> 15 hops) values occur with low probability and are under-utilized. Second, the
schemes allow routers to reset the distance information. Distance information embedded
by remote routers are likely to be overwritten by routers closer to the victim. Again, as
shown in Figure 4.2, the distance eld ends up more frequently with small values. In sum,
the distance eld has lower entropy than uniformly random bits. The marking bits are
not eciently utilized by incorporating the distance information.
Now we measure the performance of dierent PPM schemes with respect to their
tags' entropy. For comparison, we include marking schemes of AMS and RnL. RnL or
randomize-and-link, uses large checksum cords to facilitate fast identication. RnL is
selected because its packet marks are designed to have high randomness. The drawback
of RnL is that its path reconstruction process is not scalable. The scheme RPM will be
presented in next chapter. The tags RPM generates have an entropy very close to that
































Figure 4.3: Packet mark value distributions
For a fair comparison, both RnL and AMS generate 16 16-bit packet marks for each
edge and have a marking probability of p = 1=16. RnL uses 10 bits for the checksum and
2 bits for a hash fragment; AMS uses 5 bits for the distance and 7 bits for the hash value.
The simulation uses the same topology as the previous experiment. Every edge in the
topology generates 1,000 packet marks according to the marking schemes.
Figure 4.3 shows how the accumulated ratio of packet mark varies with ratio of tags
received by the victim. Each point in the plot corresponds to a bin size of at least 1,000
distinct tags. In the ideal case, the packet marks distribution should be uniform and is
shown for comparison purpose. The plot clearly shows that the distribution generated
for AMS and RnL are skewed and much worse than the uniform distribution. For AMS,
up to 70% of all tags are carried by a small number of packets (< 1%). RnL performs
better, where about 80% of all tags are carried by 20% of the packets. Another interesting
observation is that a large number of packets (> 50%) carry small portion (< 2%) of all
distinct tags for both AMS and RnL.
Given that the packet marks generated locally by RnL is fairly uniformly and randomly
distributed, it may be surprising that the tags received by the victim is so clustered. This
clustering eect can be attributed to the fact that markings are performed independently
by each router. As a result, tags generated by routers close to the victim tend to be
received by the victim while the routers further away tend to have their tags overwritten.
One approach to increase the randomness of the tags received is to allow routers further
away to mark the packets more often. However, such approach will require additional
coordination and global message exchanges which are not considered in this work.
50 A General Probabilistic Packet Marking Model
Nevertheless, Figure 4.3 clearly shows that tags collected from RnL are much more
uniformly distributed than AMS. The average entropy computed for RnL tags is 12.62
bits (out of 16) and tags from AMS has an entropy of 11.99. The entropy and distribution
of tags from RPM are very close to RnL. Hence, it is expected that RnL should have much
higher traceback accuracy than AMS. RPM's traceback accuracy is expected to match
RnL, but its path reconstruction process is more ecient.
To verify the utility of using entropy as a measure of marking performance, 1,000
attack paths, or equivalent to over 4,650 attack edges generate tags for identication, using
the parametrization above. The performance of RPM will be presented in next chapter.
All edges in the network are tested for malice which makes the result independent of the
reconstruction scheme. RnL has a false positives ratio  of 0.19, while the  for AMS is
5.56. The result clearly shows that schemes with higher entropy can achieve much better
performance (lower ).
4.3.2 Identication and Reconstruction Eort
From marked packets, the victim wants to reconstruct the attack paths. This can be done
by rst identifying the markers, and then deriving the paths. Exhaustive enumeration of
all subsets of markers, and estimating their respective packet rate is infeasible. To aid
identication, structured information can be embedded into the tags. This information
facilitates association between packet marks and the marker, or links dierent packet
marks generated by the same marker. There are generally two assumptions made in
the reconstruction, no network topology information available or available of (partial)
topology information.
Without Topology Information
RnL is designed for a marker to transmit a message, which can be the marker's identity.
In RnL, the reconstruction of the message, or identication can be carried out without
prior knowledge of the network. It associates fragments of a path information message
using checksum cord. A fragment has v (3 to 6) bits, but 8 to 11 bits out of 17 is allocated
to the checksum, so as to reduce the likelihood that dierent markers producing the same
cord in the whole network. Identication uses checksum as an associative address of
message fragments, as it is invariant for a message. The verication of valid fragment
combinations is expensive, particularly when many markers have the same checksum. By
using combinatorial search to reconstruct multiple attack paths, the scalability of RnL is
limited.
The algebraic approach [24] proposes an interesting way to reconstruct the attack
path. In this approach, only a small number of packets is needed for reconstruction. The
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scheme has exible parameterizations, with the length of a packet mark ranges from 18
to 25. It uses s bits to instantiate a random variable, and use router IP addresses as
the coecients to construct a polynomial. v bits are allocated to store the evaluated
polynomial. h bits are assigned to keep track of the number of participating routers,
which is translated into the degree of the polynomial. The values of v and h are tunable
depending on the total number of bits allocated to a tag. The entropy of each component
is high. However, the encoding and path reconstruction processes are expensive. Even
though BCH decoding can be employed to nd a high degree polynomial among samples,
no known algorithm can eciently identify multiple polynomials among samples. That
is, its path reconstruction does not scale with multiple attack paths.
With Topology Information
An example scheme that uses topology information is AMS. AMS assumes that the up-
stream router map is available. It subdivides the path information to track the hop count
from the marker to the victim. The distance information binds dierent fragments of
a message. It reduces the path reconstruction complexity by limiting the combinatorial
search of messages to each distance. However, as shown in Section 4.3.1, storing distance
information reduces entropy of tags.
In general, reconstruction without any topology information is expensive. Hence, re-
construction with topology information is more practical. For eectiveness, it is important
that the information associating tags to markers have high entropy. At the same time,
using more bits to limit the search space can increase the reconstruction eciency. In the
next chapter, we will present our algorithm RPM that takes all these considerations into
account.
4.4 Discussions on Practical Limitations
Topology
Eectiveness of the identication of attack paths is conditioned on the correctness of
topology information. Network topology could be obtained through probing with trace
route utility, or from available results of network structure analysis, e.g. Internet map-
ping project. Note that trace route can also be exploited by penetration testers to gather
information about network infrastructure and IP ranges around a given host. So sup-
plying detailed information about internal pathways is restricted for privacy and security
reasons in many organizations. However, a topology map with only gateway information
could already be helpful to identify attack paths, and such information is relatively easy
to obtain. The network topology we obtain may have slight variations from the topology
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during attack. Timeliness of the release of network topology thus aects the correct iden-
tication of attack paths. However, our attack path reconstruction is not very sensitive
to the accuracy of topology. We need only the adjacency relationship among routers to
progress the path reconstruction hop by hop upstream.
Router cooperation
PPM requires router cooperation across autonomous systems (ASes). It may impact
the practicality of PPM, because individual AS makes independent policies. Incentives
for performing packet marking could be low for upstream routers. However, ASes that
contribute to protect servers in other ASes should receive help and cooperation in re-
ciprocal. And identifying the downstream routers of attack paths is urgently needed by
packet throttling type of defences. We note that PPM does not require contiguous routers
performing the task. Selective cooperative routers scattered over the network would still
make it eective. Suppose only gateways participate in the marking, not only the internal
structures of ASes have better privacy, but also the scale of the identication problem
is reduced. We are potential in more accurately identifying the ASes where attackers
originate, then the ASes can identify and handle the attack sources locally.
4.5 Summary
IP traceback has been an actively researched DDoS defence. For attack packets with
spoofed source addresses, IP traceback traces the paths they traverse up to the sources.
Traceback also benets trac accounting applications, such as tracking clients' bandwidth
utilization, or locating the bottleneck links in the network.
In this chapter, we present a general model for PPM schemes. The general model
provides a platform for PPM schemes comparison and helps to identify the appropriate
system parameters. We also show that entropy is a good predictor of traceback accuracy
and the use of hop count information in tags reduces the entropy.
Chapter 5
Random Packet Marking for
Traceback
From the analysis we made on the general packet marking model in the previous chapter, we in-
stantiate a probabilistic packet marking scheme named Random Packet Marking for IP traceback.
Our scheme improves the packet marks quality through increasing their randomness, and hence
signicantly improves the accuracy of identifying DDoS attack paths.
5.1 Overview
Guided by the general probabilistic packet marking model presented in Chapter 4, we
design a PPM scheme, called Random Packet Marking (RPM). The marking process is
very simple, and it is a direct implementation of the model. No sophisticated structure
or relationship is required for the tags. For example, many existing schemes divide the
allocated bits into groups and dierent groups have dierent functionalities, like hop-
count, hash value etc. In contrast, RPM treats all bits equally. For the reconstruction of
marker identities, RPM employs a hop-by-hop reconstruction similar to AMS [74]. Hence,
some prior knowledge of network topology is required. Simulation results show that RPM
signicantly outperforms AMS in acquiring higher traceback accuracy. Compared to
schemes based on algebraic coding [24], RPM has much lower reconstruction cost and
achieves higher scalability for the same number of attackers and packet markers.
The eectiveness of RPM demonstrates that, with knowledge of the neighboring nodes,
it is undesirable to enforce structures in tags, since the structures impose constraint on
the choice of tags. Without the constraint introduced by structures, each packet can carry
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more information and the chance of collision (that is, false positive) can be reduced.
5.2 Random Packet Marking (RPM) Scheme
As mentioned in Section 4.3.2, RnL is designed for scenarios where knowledge of the
network topology is not available during identication. Without network topology, it is
computationally dicult to identify large number of markers, although sucient infor-
mation is hidden in the tags. On the other hand, some PPM schemes facilitate easy
identication but sacrice some randomness in the tags, reducing the amount of informa-
tion tags carry. For example, AMS exploits topology information and encodes hop count
to facilitate ecient reconstruction; but the entropy per tag is low.
In this section, we present RPM that naturally follows from our model. RPM achieves
both high entropy tags and ecient reconstruction. It does not divide a packet mark into
components. All available bits are allocated to tags associated with markers. The eec-
tiveness of RPM is inuenced by the collision probability of the distributions Di. Yet
RPM is general enough to support any functions in assigning Di. RPM caters for high
entropy in the mixture of packet mark distributions. With a reasonable Di assignment
function and a proper setting of system parameters, RPM suces in obtaining high trace-
back accuracy. Its path reconstruction is lightweight and scalable, aided by the topology
information. RPM improves over AMS in that its marking scheme is simple, fast, and
the marks have high entropy. At the same time, RPM simplies RnL and extends it to
identify large number of markers with topology information.
5.2.1 Packet Marking
We choose to employ edges as the markers. RPM works on graph structured networks.
Edge encoding facilitates a hop-by-hop reconstruction of the attack graph.
In this scheme, the size of the set of tags Xi (recall that x 2 Xi i Di(x) > 0) is the
same for every marker i. Let
h = jXij:
The association of Xi to an edge i is obtained using a known hash function, for example,
taking the rst L bits from the output of SHA. For an edge with IP addresses IP1 and
IP2, let us represent the identity of this edge as i = IP1kIP2 where k is concatenation.
The set Xi assigned to i is
f H(rkIP1kIP2) j r = 1; 2; : : : ; h g
where H is the hash function whose output is a L-bit sequence.
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For clarity, let us recall the marking process. For the marker i with the associated Xi,
when a packet is received, the followings are carried out:
 With probability , randomly and uniformly picks a x from Xi, and write x into the
packet header.
There are two important parameters for us to determine,  and h, which will be
discussed in Section 5.3.1. An example in our experiment takes  = 116 , L = 16 and
h = 24.
Note that the markers make decisions independently and they mark packets by over-
writing existing values. It evades the potential domino eect from malicious packet mark
manipulation. Even if there are compromised routers in the network, the attack paths re-
constructed are reliable up to the nearest attacking routers. It improves the survivability
of traceback, compared to marking schemes that rely on existing packet marks [5, 24].
5.2.2 Path Reconstruction
Path reconstruction nds the likely attack edges based on a collection of packet marks
and connects the edges to reconstruct the attack paths. Packet marks are generated on
attack and benign paths alike. Those from benign paths can be treated as noise in the
reconstruction. RPM works on graph structured networks. Edge encoding facilitates a
hop by hop reconstruction of the attack graph. It is assumed that the victim has an
upstream router map. This is a reasonable assumption that is also made in [74, 93].
We now describe two methods. Both methods follow the hop-by-hop approach. They
dier in the choice of an evaluation function that decides whether a given edge is a marker.
The rst evaluation function employs a Bloom lter, which is fast to compute but some
information is discarded. Specically, it only keeps track of the unique L-bit tags that
the victim receives, but not the number of packets for each tag. The second evaluation
function counts the number of occurrences per tag, and estimates the likelihood of an
edge contributing to the tags received by the victim.
In a noiseless path reconstruction, the victim is assumed to be capable of dierentiating
malicious packets from benign ones. For example, in TCP SYN oods, malicious packets
with spoofed addresses never completely establish a network connection; whereas benign
packets abide by the network protocol and their sources are responsive. The victim can
process only packet marks from non-responsive sources for path reconstruction. A Bloom
lter [11] is used to store packet marks received from the attackers. With sucient packets
received, the victim performs a breadth-rst search on the topology to reconstruct the
attack paths edge by edge. It starts by testing if the edges composed of an immediate
upstream router and itself belong to the attack graph. Recall that a router's marking
behavior is fully determined by its IP address and the random identier. The victim
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checks all neighboring edges, and computes for each edge the resulting packet marks.
Benign edges are ruled out if not all packet marks encoding the edge are in the Bloom
lter, else the edge is determined as residing on an attack path. The search continues at
the identied edges until the obtained attack graph cannot be further extended.
In a noisy reconstruction, the victim does not pre-process the packets to discard benign
packet marks. All packet marks are supplied to the path reconcentration procedure.
In the presence of noise, it is more appropriate for the victim to evaluate the likelihood
of an attack edge based on the occurrence frequencies of its packet marks rather than
simply based on their existence. A counting Bloom lter is used to store the occurrence
frequency of each packet mark. The frequency of packet marks generated by an edge
reects the packet rate the edge experiences. If the likelihood exceeds some threshold,
the edge is identied as attacking. Note that the threshold is distance dependent. Edges
approaching the victim have gradually higher thresholds, because their packet marks
experience lower probability of being overwritten and appear more frequently.








where #He;i measures the number of packets having mark vi of marker e. This equation
computes, for a marker, the algebraic mean of the occurrence frequencies of its packet
marks. Because occurrence frequency of packet marks is proportional to the packet rate,
and packet rate is the dierentiation criteria between benign users and attackers, the value
from Equation 5.1 gives the relative measure of condence in determining attackers.
The pseudocodes below summarize the path reconstruction procedure.
RPM Reconstruction
Start at the victim's immediate edges
Compute mean(edge mark frequencies)
(Equation 5.1)
if mean  threshold then
Add this edge to the attack graph
Move on to upstream edges
end if
It is assumed attackers are sending at much higher rate than non-attackers. Larger
trac rate thus provides higher condence in identifying an attack edge. Assuming that
the victim is interested in paths with packet rate greater than Ratt, the packet mark
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threshold for edges at distance t from the victim can be computed as
1
h
(1  )(t 1) Ratt + Z
where Z is an estimated noise level. This can be estimated using the average of a few
randomly chosen sets of h tags.
RPM and AMS have similar reconstruction cost. Both schemes use topology informa-
tion to perform a breadth-rst search.
5.3 Evaluation
5.3.1 System Parameters
There are two parameters in the model we presented,  and h. Both of them aect the
identication accuracy. The number of tags h each marker should generate plays a very
important role in determining a scheme's eectiveness.
Choice of 
Assuming the marking probability  is uniform across all markers, there are two factors
aecting the choice of the  value. One is that the mixture of mark distributions must
retain portions of contribution from each upstream marker, as the mixture is the basis for
identifying markers. Markers d hops away from the victim has a probability of 1 (1 )d 1
of its packet marks being overwritten. This probability drops with decreasing ; larger
portions of upstream markers' contribution can be retained, especially for the farthest
markers. The other factor for choosing  concerns with the marking workload. Smaller
 means lighter workload for each marker. Therefore, small values are preferred for .
Generally, the values between 0.03 to 0.06 provide a good tradeo. If  is too small, the
victim is required to handle a large amount of trac before it can gather a converged
mixture of packet mark distributions.
Choice of h
In this section, we analyze the eect of dierent h on the false positives, when Bloom lter
is used for reconstruction. Recall from Section 4.3.1 that high entropy tags facilitates
high traceback accuracy. However, it is not always true that the higher the packet mark
entropy, the better the traceback accuracy. Consider an extreme case where every marker
holds 2L distinct tags and uniformly randomly selects them to mark packets. Entropy of
the collection of tags is close to the maximum, L, but the ability to dierentiate markers
is lost. Bloom lter has its ll factor increases quickly with markers, if each marker has
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Figure 5.1: Eect of marking component lengths
many distinct tags; so is the false positive probability. Hence the choice of h is crucial to
the scheme's eectiveness.
Consider a non-attack node i. It will be wrongly classied as an attack node if all of
its associated tags are received by the victim. Let ^ be the probability that the node is
wrongly classied. Since the reconstruction is carried out hop-by-hop, not all nodes in
the network will be evaluated. Hence, it is not easy to relate ^ to the false positive of the
overall scheme. Nevertheless, the analysis of ^ provides some insights on the choice of h.
We do not consider false negative since the bloom lter will not miss any attacker.
We assume that the tags assigned to the markers are random. Since there are m
attack nodes, and each node is assigned h tags, there are a total of mh tags chosen (there
are likely to have repetitions within the mh tags). We can approximate this assignment
as the random assignment of mh balls into 2L boxes1, where each box correspond to a
tag. WLOG, let us assume that the rst h boxes are assigned to the non-attack node i.
Hence ^ can be approximated as the probability that all the rst h boxes are lled, which












where e is the based of natural logarithm.
We perform the following simulation to analyze the role of h. The same edges data
1The two processes are not equivalent since each marker has exactly h distinct tags.
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Table 5.1: Comparison in bit allocation of PPM Schemes
Scheme #Bits Path Info (x) Hash Index
(L) (ID Info, Dist) (log2 h)
FMS 16 (8; 5) 3
AMS 16 (8; 5) 3
FIT 16+5 (13; 1 + 5) 2
RPM 16 (16; 0) 0
set as in Section 4.3.1 is used. L is set to 16. Each edge generates 1,000 packets with
h randomly chosen tags. For each h, 1 to over 8,000 edges are randomly chosen as
malicious. The false positives ratio  is measured as the ratio of falsely accused edges to
attack edges. Figure 5.1 illustrates how traceback accuracy varies with number of attack
edges for dierent h. From Figure 5.1, when m = 4; 000, h = 8 or 16 has the lowest false
positive ratio. From Equation 5.2,  is minimized when h = 12. When m = 8; 000, 
attains minimum at h = 5. The optimal , computed using Equations 5.2, achieved for
various number of attackers is also shown in Figure 5.1. The simulation result largely
agrees with the analytical model.
When h = 2,  is high even with relatively small number of attack edges. However,
 increases slowly as the number of attack edges increases. From Equation 5.2, h = 1 is
the optimal setting if there are about 20,000 attack edges, with  approaches 1.66. As
h increases to 24, false positive tends to be lower for number of attack edges less than
4,000. Beyond 24,  increases quickly for large values of h. For number of attack edges
from 4,000 to 8,000, h = 23 is an optimal conguration.
In general, the result shows that there is an optimal number of unique tags each marker
should generate given the number of attackers. However, as the number of attackers
cannot be predicted, h has to be set to a value that is appropriate for the maximum
attackers anticipated.
Based on the analysis and simulation, it is now useful to compare the congura-
tion of PPM schemes using our analysis on the choice of h. Table 5.1 summarizes the bit
allocations for packet marks of several PPM schemes. These schemes are Fragment Mark-
ing Scheme(FMS) [69], Advanced Marking Scheme (AMS) [74], Fast Internet Traceback
(FIT) [93] and our proposed scheme, Random Packet Marking (RPM). Randomize-and-
Link (RnL) [35] and the algebraic encoding approach [24] both exploit more than 16 bits
as L, and have exible settings in lengths of hash index and path information (Section
4.3.2). Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that most of the schemes, including RnL and
the algebraic encoding, use 2 or 3 bits for hash index, thus h is 4 or 8. For a large number
of attack edges, h = 22 or 23 suces. When h = 23, the schemes are optimized for 4,000
to 8,000 attack edges. For a smaller number of attack edges, h = 24 is a better choice.
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Figure 5.2: False positives of AMS and RPM (noiseless)
5.3.2 Performance
For evaluation, we compare RPM to AMS. AMS is selected as it is the most scalable
among existing schemes that use 16-bit packet marks. The network topology used is
drawn from the Internet Mapping Project [1] data captured on January 2006. The data
set contains the route information from a source to 111,342 ( 216:8) destinations. There
are 260,386 ( 218:0) unique edges or 209,582 ( 217:7) distinct nodes. The single source
is used as the victim. From 100 to 1,250 nodes are randomly chosen as the sources of
attack packets. They may reside anywhere in the network. The attack path packet rate is
set to 1,000 packets per second, and the benign path packet rate is set to 110 of an attack
path. Each attack is simulated for 10 seconds. By then, the relative amount of dierent
packet marks are stable, and the collection is enough to reconstruct the attack graph.
In the experiments, the parameters for RPM are  = 116 and h = 16. The setting
for AMS is as stated in [69], and referenced in Table 5.1. Simulations show that both
AMS and RPM have negligible false negatives, hence their  lines are omitted from the
gures. Their performances are compared only in terms of , the false positives ratio in
identifying edges.
Figure 5.2 shows how  varies with number of attack paths in the noiseless case where
only packets from attackers are considered. It can be clearly observed that AMS has
exponentially increasing  with the increasing number of attack paths. When there are
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Figure 5.3: False positives of AMS and RPM (noisy)
Figure 5.3 shows the case where packet marks from both user and attacker paths
are supplied to the path reconstruction procedure. 200 user paths and varying number
of attack paths are simulated. The result is similar, though both AMS and RPM have
higher false positives. With 1,000 attack paths, RPM and AMS have  values of 0.09 and
1.28 respectively.
The improvement can be explained by comparing the packet marks entropy shown in
Figure 4.3. It shows that the packet entropy of RPM is very close to that of RnL, and is
much higher than AMS.
Figure 5.4 shows the number of routers falsely identied at each distance. The number
of attack nodes at each distance is also shown in the gure as a reference. In the simulation,
there are 1,000 attack paths and 200 user paths. At distances of 9-14 hops away, where
there are many routers, AMS generates many false positives. This is because AMS cannot
resolve packet mark collisions of routers at the same distance. On the other hand, RPM
has small amount of false positives at all distances.
Finally, Figure 5.5 shows  for RPM under dierent scenarios. The `RPM noisy (200
users)' case maintains 200 normal users, varying the number of attack paths from 100 to
1,250. In the gure, the x-axis represents the number of attack paths for this case. The
`RPM noisy (200 attackers)' case keeps a constant number of 200 attack paths, but varies
the number of users from 100 to 1,250. The x-axis denotes the number of users in this
case. It can be clearly seen that even in the presence of noise, RPM still outperforms
AMS (noiseless) by a signicant amount.
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Figure 5.4: False positives of AMS and RPM by distance
5.3.3 Gossib Attack and RPM's Survivability
Gossib (Groups of Strongly SImilar Birthdays) attack [85] was proposed by Waldvogel.
It can be used to obtain eects similar to a birthday attack on PPM traceback schemes.
Gossib increases the state space for the victim to search, by randomly inserting edge
fragments into the packet marks. Simultaneously, it inserts misleading edges into the
attack graph. In addition, it optimizes the number of packets needed to fake the edges or
edge fragments.
Gossib attack appears severe to PPM traceback, for a diligent attacker can forge as
many packet marks as the amount of trac it transmits, in comparison to a PPM marker
who performs the marking routine at around 1/20 of the time.
However, routers can co-operate to proactively identify and lter forged packet marks,
using an approach inspired by route-based distributed packet ltering (DPF) [63]. Park
and Lee proposed DPF as a defense against address spoong. A gateway router veries
the incoming addresses with respect to the topology. When a source address is invalid
against an interface, the gateway lters the packet. A number of spoofed packets can
survive even with the gateway's ltering check, which is when the spoofed addresses
indeed are expected from the particular interface, but are either behind or in front of the
attacker. DPF limits the number of allowed address spoong. The paper claims with
20% of all gateway routers performing the check, the eect of address spoong becomes
contained.
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Figure 5.5: False positives of RPM
to validate if the packet marks are expected to their interfaces. When a mismatch occurs,
the packet marks can be safely eliminated, by restoring them to all 0's. The strategic
points can be based on topology and distance between routers.
For example, a checking router can be placed at about 3 to 5 hops away from another
checker. So each checker keeps track of all the possible packet marks of its upstream
markers within 3 to 5 hops. Using the same bit-allocation of packet marks as in Section
5.3.2, each checker keeps about 16 packet marks for each nearby upstream router. The
coverage eect by 20% routers can be achieved with this simple proposal, and the result
of DPF can apply.
By placing checkers at strategic points, the bogus packet marks can be eliminated
early. More importantly, the number of allowed packet marks each checker needs to
keep track of can be minimized. Hence strengthening the dierentiability of packet mark
validity. The exact placement of the checkers are topology dependent. In general, the
rule of thumb is to place them before the bottleneck links, where multiple branches in the
network graph merge.
As defending against the Gossib attack is not the focus of our paper, we do not
reproduce the evaluations similar to the DPF research. It is sucient to note that it
is possible for RPM (and PPM traceback schemes in general) to survive diligent Gossib
attackers.
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5.4 Summary
We present a PPM scheme called RPM that has good traceback accuracy and ecient
path reconstruction. Simulations show improved scalability and traceback accuracy over
prior works. For example, a thousand attack paths induce 63% of false positives in terms of
edges identication by using AMS. RPM lowers the false positives to 2%. The eectiveness
of RPM demonstrated that imposing sophisticated structures on tags is not necessary.
If imposing the structure reduces the randomness in tags, it should be avoided. The
improvement of RPM over prior schemes is mainly the result of increasing the information
carried by packet marks.
Chapter 6
Website Fingerprinting over VPN
We consider a trac model of encrypted and proxied web browsing trac, such as through VPN,
SSH and SSL/TLS encrypted tunnels. We passively analyze the web trac to extract side channel
information to identify \ngerprints" of websites. We develop a scheme that introduces packet
ordering information into website ngerprints in addition to the commonly used packet sizes.
6.1 Overview
Website ngerprinting aims to identify the website accessed in some low latency, encrypted
tunnels. Website \ngerprints" are proled on side channel features observed from the
HTTP streams. By HTTP stream, we mean the stream of packets sent and received when
web pages are accessed. From the perspective of web clients, website ngerprinting raises
the privacy concern and indicates the need for further anonymization. On the other hand,
such techniques aid the legitimate warden to track web accesses over encrypted channel.
Existing website ngerprinting schemes naturally ngerprint websites using packet
size related features [40, 78, 50], since neither the IP address nor domain name of the
website is available due to encryption and proxies. Due to network delay variations and
the HTTP pipelining mechanism adopted by modern browsers, the ordering of packets
varies in dierent accesses to the same website, previous works [40, 78, 50] have chosen
to discard the information on packet ordering. For example, Liberatore and Levine's
scheme [50] represents each website ngerprint as a set of packet sizes and uses a variant
of set-dierence to measure the similarity of two ngerprints.
In this chapter, we propose a website ngerprinting scheme that exploits packet order-
ing information, as well as information on packet sizes. We argue that although packets
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can be signicantly reordered by HTTP pipelining and networks eects, there is sucient
residual information in packet ordering to facilitate ngerprinting, and thus improving
the website identication accuracy.
Our scheme is evaluated on a classication problem that identies an HTTP stream
among a list of proled websites, as well as a detection problem in which it is uncertain
whether the test website belongs to the proled set.
We tested our scheme on datasets containing up to 2,000 websites, with traces collected
over two months. For the classication problem, we test our scheme with full length
OpenVPN test streams, i.e., 30-second long encrypted HTTP streams tunneled through
VPN proxy server, and the website identication accuracy is 97% among 1,000 websites.
We also test with partial SSH traces that capture only the rst few seconds of encrypted
communication, the accuracy is 81% among 2,000 websites, still over 10% better than the
previous scheme. For the detection problem, our scheme presents an equal error rate at
7%, which is signicantly better than the previous scheme at 20%. Hence, for both types
of evaluations, our scheme yields superior identication accuracy than previous schemes.
In addition, we analyze the consistency of our website ngerprints, with respect to
static and dynamic websites, and dierent HTTP pipelining congurations. We nd that
only 6% of the websites need reproling after a month. The results verify that our feature
selection generates consistent ngerprints.
6.2 Trac Analysis Model
We use passive trac analysis to ngerprint websites. There are two important observa-
tions that enable us to adopt this model. The observations are: (i) webpage download
by HTTP is highly structured; and (ii) encryption and proxy do not severely alter the
packet sizes, nor the packet ordering. The advantage of passive trac analysis is that the
presence of a warden is completely transparent.
The HTTP streams for analysis are captured over the protected tunnel between client
and the VPN or SSH server, as shown in Figure 6.1. As in previous works [40, 78, 50, 10],
we assume browser caching is disabled. Website ngerprints are extracted from the HTTP
streams. Several ngerprint instances form the prole of a website. A testing stream is
compared to each prole for identication.
Trac Model
Our ngerprinting model supports most browser congurations and the following connec-
tion patterns are accommodated (i) multiple TCP connections can be opened to download
in parallel dierent embedded objects, (ii) each TCP connection can be reused to down-
load multiple objects, (iii) HTTP requests can be pipelined in each connection, and (iv)
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Figure 6.1: Illustration of trac analysis setup
all sessions are multiplexed onto a single port.
The connection patterns speed up the webpage download, but they increase the di-
culty to ngerprint websites. HTTP pipelining means a client is allowed to make multiple
requests without waiting for each response. Because of multiple TCP connections and
HTTP pipelining, data packets of dierent embedded objects can interleave, thus object
sizes cannot be determined by accumulating the amount of data received between con-
secutive HTTP requests. Multiplexing communication sessions hides the number of TCP
connections opened and the number of objects in a webpage.
Problem Scenarios
We tackle two problem scenarios, classication and detection. In both scenarios, a set D
of, say 1000, websites are proled.
 Classication Given a test stream which is known to be a visit to a website in D,
identify the website. This is the same problem addressed in previous work.
 Detection Given a test stream, determine whether it is a visit to a website in D,
and identify the website if it is. We examine the false positive rate (FPR) and
false negative rate (FNR) in identication. This problem has not been addressed in
previous work.
The classication scenario requires the ngerprints of a website be suciently similar.
While the detection scenario further requires ngerprints of dierent websites be su-
ciently dissimilar.
Noise Model
There are a few sources of noises that degrade the consistency of HTTP streams, even if the
website contents have not changed. Connection multiplexing and browser conguration
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in HTTP pipelining are the main sources aecting the ordering of objects. In addition,
the object request order may be browser specic, and the dynamics in network condition
causes some random noise.
6.3 Website Fingerprinting Scheme
The ngerprint prole of a website is built by accessing the website through the encrypted
tunnel and extracting the ngerprints from captured HTTP streams. Testing streams
are captured in a similar way, from which ngerprints are extracted and compared to
the ngerprint proles for identication. We present the details on ngerprint feature
selection and extraction, and ngerprint similarity comparison in this section.
6.3.1 Fingerprint Feature Selection
A straightforward approach to represent the ngerprint of an HTTP stream is by using
the sequence of all packet sizes and directions, i.e. ngerprint F = h(s1, d1), (s2, d2), ...i
where si is i-th packet size, and di is its direction. Clearly, the approach makes ngerprint
comparison inecient, since each sequence easily contains over a thousand elements. Yet
more importantly, the identication accuracy will be aected, because the ordering of
some packets often changes due to various noises. Hence, we apply domain knowledge to
select features.
Firstly, packets with sizes smaller than a threshold are considered control packets and
discarded from ngerprints, as control packets do not represent the webpage content and
potentially vary across traces.
Secondly, we keep only the non-MTU (Maximum Transmission Unit) downloading
packets as features of HTTP responses. The reasons why we exclude the MTU download-
ing packets are explained below.
Ideally, we would like to monitor object sizes rather than packet sizes, as inline objects
are less variable and more characteristic to a website. However, data of dierent objects
can interleave in transmission due to multiple TCP connections, HTTP pipelining and
connection multiplexing. It is dicult to associate the data blocks to their respective
objects. Fortunately, HTTP transmission is not random. Majority of web servers transfer
data in chunks. In each data chunk, all packets are sized as path MTU, except the last
packet transferring the remaining data. Therefore, although we cannot estimate object
sizes, we can leverage the last packet size of a data chunk, as it is specic to an object
component. As for packet ordering, packets that change their orders tend to be the
intermediate packets of dierent objects. By ltering the intermediate packets, we reduce
the probability of ngerprint inconsistency.
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Thirdly, we design the ngerprint of an HTTP stream to be two sequences, represent-
ing the request and response features respectively. Although a request must precede its
corresponding response, the order of other requests to this response is not deterministic,
but sensitive to the pipelining conguration. Hence the request and response features are
not merged into a single sequence.
Therefore, to ngerprint a website over encrypted tunnels, the side channel features
we select are (i) sequence of HTTP request sizes and (ii) sequence of HTTP
response sizes (except MTU packets). Note that the number of objects and the number
of components in object responses are two implicit features represented by the lengths of
these two sequences.
The features we select closely adhere to the webpage content and layout. The request
sequence reveals the relative locations of the embedded objects in a webpage and their
URL lengths. The sequence is consistent since webpages tend to have stable layout, and
browsers issue the object requests in the order they parse the object references. The
response sequence indicates the download completion order of the object components and
their last packet sizes. The sequence is stable since web servers serve requests in the
order they are received, and the response chunks are ordered by the object components.
Hence our website ngerprints are very consistent across traces, if network dynamics are
disregarded and the browser conguration is xed.
We identify the HTTP requests and responses by packet sizes. As client sends packets
to the server either as acknowledgements or to make requests, any packet in the uploading
direction (from client to server) with size greater than a threshold is considered a request.
For the downloading trac, we can broadly classify the packets into three types, which
we call 0-size packets, MTU-size packets and non-MTU-size packets. The 0-size packets
carry no object data, but are control packets added by OpenVPN, HTTP or TCP for
communication management. TheMTU-size packets transmit the continuous object data,
with sizes close to the path MTU. The rest packets belong to the non-MTU-size category.
Since TLS requires the sender to ush each record [41], we use non-MTU-size packet as
the signal for completion of a message chunk, and hence as a signature for an HTTP
response.
Note that DNS queries and replies are encapsulated and encrypted into TCP packets.
They may contribute to the ngerprint sequences depending on their packet lengths after
encryption. In any case, the order and sizes of the DNS queries and replies are consis-
tent since they occur when new TCP connections are about to be established for object
retrieval from a third party server, and their order and lengths represent the domain
name length of the referenced server and the approximate location of the reference in the
webpage.
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Estimate of Number of Unique Fingerprints
Based on the possible number of feature values and ordering, we can estimate the num-
ber of unique ngerprints and hence the potential number of distinguishable websites.
From the dataset containing the ngerprints of the homepages of about 1,000 popular
websites, the average number of object requests and response components are 66.5 and
135.9 respectively. Since each non-MTU-size packet can take over 1,000 possible values
and repetitions are allowed, the number of unique ngerprints is estimated to be over
1; 000202:4  22024. This number is an underestimation because it assumes website nger-
prints are of the same length. Yet not all websites can be uniquely identied. For pure
HTML webpages without embedded objects, approximately 1M unique ngerprints are
available, but the number of such webpages is larger. Fortunately, popular websites of
interest for identication usually have large number embedded objects, e.g. graphics and
advertisements. Websites that have relatively long ngerprint sequences naturally have
higher probability of being uniquely identiable.
6.3.2 Fingerprint Similarity Measurement
Edit distance measures the number of edit operations to make two strings identical. Lev-
enshtein distance is a form of edit distance that allows insertion, deletion or substitution
of a single character. We use Levenshtein distance to measure the similarity between two
ngerprints. It is commonly computed using the Wagner-Fischer algorithm [84].
In our application, we set the cost of insertion, deletion and substitution all equal
to 1. If network dynamics are disregarded, each operation reects a modication to an
embedded object, and we do not consider any operation changes the webpage more.
We normalize the edit distance by max(jxj; jyj), where jxj denotes the length of se-
quence x. We dene similarity = 1 distance, to convert the distance measurement into
similarity. Given two ngerprints, two similarity values measured on the object request
sequences and on the non-MTU response sequences are combined as follows:
  simHTTPget + (1  )  simnonMTUpkts
where  is a tunable parameter, indicating the degree of reliability of the similarity values.
We set  = 0:6 in our experiments, as the sequence of object requests is more stable.
The probability of a test stream coming from a particular website is determined as the
maximum similarity between the ngerprint of this stream and the various ngerprints
in the website prole.
Edit distance is chosen as our similarity measure because (i) ngerprint instances
vary as a result of network dynamics and webpage updates, whose eects are shown as
insertion, deletion or substitution in the sequences, (ii) it considers the order information,
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which diers from Jaccard's coecient that treats the feature values as a set, and (iii)
the length information of ngerprint sequences are encapsulated for evaluation.
Example
Given two ngerprints FA = (Areq, Ares) and FB = (Breq, Bres), where Areq = h436, 516,
500, 532i, Ares = h548, 628, 1348, 1188, 596, 372, 980i, Breq = h436, 516, 500, 253, 500i
and Bres = h548, 628, 1348, 1188, 436, 412, 1268i.
To make the request sequences Areq of FA and Breq of FB identical, we need two edit
operations: delete the last 500 from the Breq, and change 253 in Breq to 532. Thus the
edit distance between the request sequences Areq and Breq is 2. We then normalize it
by dividing it by the longer length of the two sequences, the edit distance is 2/5 after
normalization. So the similarity between Areq and Breq is 1   2=5 = 3=5. Similarly, we
can compute the similarity between the two response sequences Ares and Bres, which
evaluates to 4/7. Hence when  = 0:6, the overall similarity between FA and FB is
0:6 3=5 + (1  0:6) 4=7 = 0:59.
6.4 Evaluation
In this section, we present the performance and analysis of our ngerprinting scheme. The
experiment settings and data collections are described in Section 6.4.1. We evaluate the
performance of our scheme in both classication and detection scenarios and present the
identication accuracies in Section 6.4.2. The consistency of our ngerprints with respect
to HTTP pipelining congurations, number of proling samples and website updates is
analyzed in Section 6.4.3.
6.4.1 Experiment Setup and Data Collection
We prepared three datasets on OpenVPN for evaluation, namely, static50, dynamic150,
and OpenVPN1000. The dataset static50 contains the trace data of 50 websites that are
rarely updated (less than once in a few months); the dataset dynamic150 contains the
traces of 150 websites that are frequently update (daily); and the dataset OpenVPN1000
contains the traces of 1000 popular websites.
To demonstrate that our scheme also works on SSH, we use the publicly available
dataset OpenSSH2000 [50], which contains the traces of 2000 most visited websites ac-
cessed through OpenSSH, captured once every 6 hours for 2 months. This trace captures
only packet headers in the rst 6 seconds of a webpage download.
We prepare the datasets of OpenVPN by visiting the websites1 and capturing the
1Currently we identify a website by ngerprinting its homepage. If the internal pages of a website are
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packet traces daily for 3 months. The traces are captured using TCPDump [79] between
the client and the VPN server. We used Firefox for the capture, HTTP pipelining is
enabled and its default value is 4 (at most 4 HTTP requests can be served concurrently).
Cache is cleared after each access. Flash player is installed, since many websites use ash
in their homepages. Each web access is monitored for 30 seconds, to allow the operations
of object request and response to fully complete.
The topology, size and content of high level cache is not within our control for evalu-
ation. In our experiments, the proled websites are accessed regularly, so we expect most
objects are consistently cached close to the VPN or SSH server.
We use Liberatore and Levine's scheme [50] for performance comparison, and refer to
it as the reference scheme. Our scheme that performs preprocessing is referred to as the
improved scheme, otherwise it is called the basic scheme or simply our scheme. For each
website, 15 traces are used to generate the ngerprint proles, and 10 other traces are
used for testing. The ngerprint sequence of object requests are composed of packet sizes
that are larger than 300 bytes in the uploading direction. The ngerprint sequence of non-
MTU responses consists of packet sizes between 300 to 1,450 bytes in the downloading
direction. These settings are used in our experiments, unless otherwise specied.
6.4.2 Fingerprint Identication Accuracy
In the following, we show the ngerprint identication accuracies for classication and
detection scenarios. As described in Section 6.2, a test stream is known to be from the
prole websites in the classication scenario, but it is unknown whether a test stream is
from the prole websites in the detection scenario.
Accuracy of Classication Scenario
The ngerprint identication accuracies on the OpenVPN datasets static50, dynamic150
and OpenVPN1000 are shown in Table 6.1. Note that for all three datasets, the accuracy
of our scheme is close to 100%. In comparison, the reference scheme yields an identication
accuracy of 90% when it is run on OpenVPN1000.
Dataset Static50 Dynamic150 OpenVPN1000
Accuracy 99% 97% 97%
Table 6.1: Fingerprint identication accuracy for various datasets
To demonstrate that our scheme works well for identifying websites accessed over other
tunnel, we tested it on the dataset OpenSSH2000, with parameters fully complying with
also proled, we can use the ngerprints of individual pages as well as their linkage information to identify
































Figure 6.2: False positive and false negative rates with respect to similarity thresholds
the settings in [50]. The accuracy of our scheme reaches 81%, outperforming the reference
scheme by 11%. The improvement is due to the fact that our scheme is able to identify
websites that have similar sets of packet sizes but dierent packet orders.
Accuracy of Detection Scenario
It is unknown in this scenario whether a test stream is from the proled websites. Thus
a test stream not from the proled websites may be identied wrongly as from one of
the website in the prole (false positive); and a test from the proled websites may be
identied wrongly as not from the proled websites (false negative). We evaluate the
ngerprint identication accuracy in terms of false positive rate (FPR) and false negative
rate (FNR) for the detection scenario.
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Prole Accuracy
Multiple pipeline degree 99.7%
Single pipeline degree (pipeline degree = 4) 99.3%
Table 6.2: Fingerprint identication accuracy with respect to dierent pipeline congu-
rations
From the dataset OpenVPN1000, we randomly pick 200 websites to prole. Traces
from both these 200 websites and the remaining 800 are used to test the ngerprint
identication. The accuracy of our method is shown in Figure 6.2a, and performance of
the reference scheme is shown in Figure 6.2b.
Comparing Figure 6.2a with Figure 6.2b, the FPR and FNR curves for our scheme
are more separated from each other than that for the reference scheme. The equal error
rate (EER) for our scheme occurs when the similarity threshold is 0.21, at which both
FPR and FNR are 7%. While for the reference scheme, at the similarity threshold of 0.36,
EER occurs to be 20%, almost three times of ours. If we minimize the total error rate,
i.e. sum of FPR and FNR, the optimal similarity threshold for our method will be 0.22,
with only 6% FPR and 8% FNR. While for the reference scheme, the optimal similarity
threshold will be 0.37, at which its FPR and FNR are 9% and 27% respectively. The
results show that our scheme is much stronger for dierentiating websites.
6.4.3 Consistency of Fingerprints
Website ngerprints can be inuenced by several factors even if the webpage contents have
not changed. These factors include browser pipeline conguration (Section 6.4.3) and
network dynamics (Section 6.4.3) that cause packet loss, reordering and retransmission.
Note that the randomness in the amount of control packets does not aect our ngerprint
at all. Through experiments and analysis in this section, we show that these factors do
not seriously aect the consistency of our ngerprints.
Eect of HTTP Pipelining
To illustrate the eect of HTTP pipelining on the ngerprint sequences, we vary the
pipeline degree from 1 (non-pipelined) to 8 (the maximum supported by Firefox as to
date). We capture OpenVPN traces of 100 websites. For each website, ngerprints derived
from 15 traces with varying pipeline degrees are kept as proles, and 15 test streams per
website of varying pipeline degrees are compared with their own website proles.
Figure 6.3 shows that the ngerprint similarities of a website is high. 70% of the
websites have similarity in the object request sequences higher than 0.5, and 50% of the













































(b) Sequence of non-MTU responses
Figure 6.3: Eect of pipelining on the ngerprint sequences
the similarities of a website's ngerprints have similar values at dierent pipeline degrees.
Test streams of a pipeline degree of 4 is most similar to their proles, because 4 is the
median of pipeline degrees in each prole. Because the object request and response order
is tightly associated with the webpage layout and object sizes, HTTP pipelining does not
dramatically change the ngerprint sequences.
To demonstrate that websites can be proled using a single pipeline degree, we per-
formed an experiment in which the proled ngerprints are of a single pipeline degree of
4, in comparison to the case where the proles are composed of ngerprints of various
pipeline degrees, while the test streams are always of various pipeline settings. 100 web-
sites are proled, each with 15 traces, and 15 other traces are used as test streams. The
identication accuracies are shown in Table 6.2. With either prole, the identication
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Figure 6.4: Eect of the number of learning samples
accuracy exceeds 99%. The results show that our ngerprints are not sensitive to changes
in the pipeline settings. We can identify websites with high accuracy even when they are
proled in a single pipeline degree but tested with various pipeline degrees.
Number of Proling Samples per Website
The number of samples needed to prole a website is related to the stability of the network
and the website properties such as variations in the dynamic contents. Yet these factors
are connection and website specic and may evolve over time. In order to isolate the eect
of network dynamics from webpage updates, we perform the experiment on the websites
that update infrequently, i.e., using the dataset static50. The number of proling traces
varies from 1 to 10, and 5 test streams per website are used to test the similarity to their
own website prole. Figure 6.4 shows the average and standard deviation of similarity of
all websites versus the number of proling samples. The gure shows that under normal
network condition, we only need a couple of traces to prole a static website. Increasing
the number of samples further does not increase the similarity on average. Although
network dynamics aects the object download completion order, the experiment shows
that our ngerprints are not seriously aected by it. The reason is that we only monitor
the last packets in message chunks instead of all data packets, so the probability of the
monitored packets being aected is reduced.
Eect of Website Update
To evaluate how well the proles represent websites over time, we measure the ngerprint
identication accuracy weeks after constructing the proles. The evaluation helps to





















Figure 6.5: Eect of time on accuracy
OpenVPN1000 and dynamic150 to study the impact of (frequent) content updates on the
ngerprint identication. For each website, we randomly pick 5 traces captured within
week 0 to generate the website prole, then the traces of 4 randomly chosen days in each
of week 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8, are tested against the website proles.
The results are shown in Figure 6.5. For dataset OpenVPN1000, the identication
accuracy gradually decreases over time, which remains high at 93% a month later and
becomes 88% after two months. For majority of the websites, their proles need not be
regenerated, only about 6% of the most frequently updated websites need to change their
ngerprint proles in the rst month, and another 6% in the second month. For the
dataset dynamic150, the decrease in identication accuracy is more obvious over the two-
month period, because their website contents are frequently updated, and the changes
accumulate over time. Nevertheless, the ngerprint identication accuracy is 96% one
month later, and 81% two months later.
6.4.4 Computation Eciency
The time taken to identify a website varies with the ngeprint length. It is on aver-
age about 5 seconds (measured on a PC with 2.53GHz CPU and 2GB of RAM) when
identifying the ngerprint among 1,000 website proles each containing 15 ngerprints.
The evaluation can be sped up with parallel computation on multi-core microprocessor.
The storage required is very small, and the website proles containing 15,000 ngerprints
(written in ascii format) only take 12.4 MB. The computation cost of our scheme is low,
and the storage overhead is small, so our approach is scalable.
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6.5 Discussions
We discuss several issues concerning the practicality of website ngerprinting.
Associating packets to HTTP streams.
Real life Internet trac are more complex than what we analyze in the model. One can
use Skype, IM concurrently with web browsing, and can open multiple websites at the
same time. Previous works [91, 12] have shown that application layer protocols can be
fairly reliably identied in encrypted trac. Previous work has also experimented with
using time gap to separate trac of webpages from tabbed browsing. It is based on the
assumption that the victim requests webpages sequentially due to think times, and hence
there are no overlapping transmissions. Yet the result shows it may be dicult to accu-
rately associate network packets to dierent webpages. We plan to derive new methods
in future work to extract individual web sessions from network traces.
Browser caching.
Some privacy guidelines state that browser caching should be disabled. Most internet
banking sites always remind users to clear o their browser cache after each Internet
banking session. If browser cache is enabled, one can determine if a user has accessed
some sensitive website using the attack in [27]. The victim is issued requests on some
objects of the sensitive website. From the response time, we can determine if the objects
are cached and hence whether the user has visited the website.
Browser cache is often enabled in reality for eciency. However, the experiment by
Herrmann et al. [39] on their packet size frequency based website ngerprinting shows that
the performance of their scheme is only moderately aected if browser cache is enabled.
Though the underlying reason is not thoroughly analyzed, it suggests that caching may
not be aecting website ngerprinting as much as one might think, even when the cache
size is very large (2GB) such that practically cached contents are nearly never deleted.
Information from internal pages and user interaction.
Internal pages of a website and user interaction provide additional sources of information
to website identication. If internal pages of a website are proled, we can use ngerprints
of individual pages as well as their linkage information to identify more accurately and
condently the website being surfed [16].
From encrypted Internet trac, HMM can be used to classify application layer proto-
cols, e.g. IM, web browsing, P2P sharing. Our work focuses on the web browsing trac,
to identify the website being accessed. Assuming it is known which web application is be-
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ing used, one can model the series of interactive requests and the nite number of possible
responses as state transitions, to infer the choices a user indicates [15]. User interactions
are very dynamic in general, but careful modeling and examination will help to not only
identify the website, but potentially reveal more targeted sensitive information, e.g. op-
erations performed in Internet banking. We believe these mechanisms complement one
another. We also note that the encrypted packets associated with internal pages or user
interactions are more dicult to isolate compared to identifying trac for the homepage.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we developed a robust website ngerprinting scheme over low latency
encrypted tunnels. We make use of the seemingly noisy packet ordering information,
rather than just the distribution of packet sizes as in previous work. The ordering of
a selection of packets is consistent due to the behaviorial characteristics of protocols
and browsers, and such information is preserved and exposed regardless of proxy and
encryption.
We tested our scheme extensively on datasets containing up to 2,000 websites, with
traces collected over two months. Our scheme identies websites with high accuracy on
both SSH and SSL tunnels, even for websites with dynamic contents. We moved the
evaluation model beyond closed world identication (classication problem), such that a
testing stream may be outside the set of proled websites (detection problem). For both
classication and detection problems, our scheme yields superior identication accuracy
than the previous scheme.
We also analyzed the consistency of our website ngerprints, with respect to static
and dynamic websites, and dierent HTTP pipelining congurations. The results verify
that our feature selection generates consistent ngerprints.





We investigate the robustness of our scheme proposed in the last chapter against trac morph-
ing, which is a bandwidth ecient countermeasure against website ngerprinting that changes the
packet size distribution of the source web trac to imitate another website.
7.1 Overview
We proposed in last chapter a website ngerprinting scheme that takes advantage of
packet ordering information. The scheme not only improves the ngerprint identication
accuracy upon previous results, but also withstands trac morphing that minimizes the
bandwidth overhead while transforming the packet size distribution to defend against
website ngerprinting. We show in this chapter that our website ngerprinting scheme can
dierentiate between morphed trac and its mimicked target, and that source websites
can be identied with high accuracy even with morphing.
Simple defenses to website ngerprinting have been proposed in previous works, in-
cluding variations of packet padding, e.g. maximum padding and mice-elephant packet
padding. Maximum padding pads every packet to the size of path MTU. It can thwart
size related trac analysis, but the amount of overhead it causes is nearly 150% of the
actual data [50]. Mice-elephant is less aggressive. It pads packets to two sizes, either to a
small size for control packets, or to the path MTU for data packets. Thus the information
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revealed is limited to the approximate total size of object requests and the total size of
webpage contents, including embedded objects. Yet the bandwidth overhead it causes
is 50% of the data size. The large bandwidth overhead they cost leads to insucient
incentives for deployment.
As reviewed in Section 2.5, \trac morphing" [90] is designed as a scheme to evade
detection by warden, and at the same time, incurs small bandwidth overhead. Trac
morphing alters the packet size distribution of an HTTP stream, to make it appear as
if it is from another website. A morphing matrix is pre-computed that transforms the
packet size distributions and minimizes the total increase in packet sizes. The morphing
technique targets at website ngerprinting schemes that utilize size related features but
not the ordering information. Unigram trac morphing changes the distribution of single
packet size; bigram trac morphing changes the distribution of sizes of two consecutive
packets. Limited or no ordering information is considered in bigram or unigram morphing.
The website ngerprinting scheme we propose is able to withstand trac morphing
that is constrained on bandwidth overhead minimization. Although trac morphing is ef-
fective in misleading or confusing the website identication by ngerprinting schemes that
exploit only size related features, our scheme is robust to the trac morphing technique,
as we are able to dierentiate among websites that have similar packet size distributions
but dissimilar packet ordering.
The limitation of trac morphing lies in that it cannot simultaneously satisfy low
bandwidth overhead and preserve packet ordering. The reason is that in practice, for
a given website, there are very limited choices for the size of the n-th packet once the
sizes of the previous n   1 packets are xed. We point out that if the trac morphing
scheme is extended to n-gram (n  2) morphing (morphing the distribution of sizes of n
consecutive packets), its bandwidth eciency will become worse than some simple packet
padding scheme.
Experiment results verify that our scheme is resilient to the trac morphing tech-
nique [90]. When trac is morphed according to unigram (i.e. single packet size) dis-
tribution, our scheme distinguishes the morphed trac from the mimicked target with a
success rate of 99%; while the previous scheme distinguishes only 25%. When trac is
morphed according to bigram (i.e. two adjacent packet sizes) distribution, our scheme
distinguishes 98.7%, versus 22.5% for the previous scheme. When bigram morphed trac
are mixed with traces of 2,000 other websites, our scheme correctly identies 78% of the
morphed trac, while the previous scheme identies 52%.
Our analysis suggests that both sizes and ordering features should be removed in
countermeasures to website ngerprinting. We suggest some countermeasure exploiting
randomization in packets or HTTP requests and responses. The countermeasure provides
some communication privacy and is low in bandwidth overhead, though it may trade o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the response time.
7.2 Website Fingerprinting under Trac Morphing
Our scheme is able to dierentiate website ngerprints even under trac morphing [90].
For the ease of discussion, let us call the source website WS , and its morphed trac S
0.
Website WS mimics a target website WT . The trac of WT is T . From S
0, we want to
identify WS .
We dierentiate WS and WT ngerprints by packet ordering. Assume that we know
website WS morphs its trac, while website WT does not, a large edit distance between
T and test stream S0 indicates that S0 is not from WT , because the ngerprints of WT
should be fairly consistent without morphing. Hence, test stream S0 is from website WS .
If there are k websites imitating the same target WT , source WS is likely uniquely
identiable. The reason roots at the morphing constraint to minimize bandwidth over-
head. A morph algorithm maps each source packet to some minimally dierent sizes in
the target distribution. Because of the correlation in packet sizes before and after morph-
ing, and the consistency in the ordering of unmorphed packets, morphed trac also have
reasonably consistent order. It leaves us a loophole to dierentiate among the k websites.
In evaluations, we examine the identiability of k morphed websites amid other web-
sites not related by morphing. We preprocess to narrow down the candidate websites by
packet size distributions, e.g. using L1 distance measurement.1 On one hand, the pre-
processing safeguards that the morphing websites are not ltered prematurely. Morphed
streams tend to have larger variations in packet ordering, because a source packet can map
to a few target sizes and the choice is probabilistic for each morphing instance. On the
other hand, preprocessing eliminates noise websites that the test stream may incidentally
share similar size sequence with, but are dissimilar in size distributions.
Since we evaluate the similarity of ngerprints based on the whole sequence of feature
values, our scheme can recover the identity of the morphed trac, as long as morphing
does not handle the distribution of n-gram for n close to the sequence length.
7.3 Tradeos in Morphing N-Gram Distribution
We now consider the tradeos if trac morphing preserves some packet ordering as in
morphing bigram (two adjacent packet sizes) or higher-gram distributions.
While unigram morphing changes the distribution of single packet size, bigram mor-
phing changes the distribution of two consecutive packet sizes, to make the trac appear
1L1 distance between two website ngerprints is computed as the sum of absolute dierences in their
packet size distributions.
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as if from some target website. The problem of nding the morph matrix is formulated as
an optimization problem, in which the goal is to minimize the bandwidth overhead, and
the constraints are the source and target packet size distributions. The morphing ma-
trix is pre-computed and it transforms the source to target packet size distribution with
minimum overhead. It is easy to understand that when n-gram distribution is satised,
m-gram distribution for any m > n is not necessarily satised.
Trac morphing has an important objective of bandwidth eciency. However, if
trac morphing is extended to n-gram (n  2) to consider some packet ordering informa-
tion, its bandwidth usage becomes increasingly inecient. The reason is that higher-gram
morphing has to concurrently satisfy all the lower-gram distributions, so there are very
limited choices for the size of the n-th packet once the previous n   1 packet sizes are
xed. Source packet sizes have to map to the target distribution even though the size
dierences are large. For some value of n, the bandwidth eciency of trac morphing
drops below packet padding schemes.
N -gram morphing has a considerable computation cost which grows exponentially
with the number of grams considered. The computation is performed to nd the morph-
ing matrix that minimizes the bandwidth overhead. In the worst case, n-gram morphing
needs to optimize x2(n 1) + x2(n 2) + :::x2 + 1 matrixes per source-target pair of web-
sites, with each matrix containing x2 elements. Here x represents the number of distinct
lengths of packet payload. Its maximum is 1461 for Ethernet packets. If we consider
unigram morphing trades o computation for bandwidth, then when n increases, all the
computation, storage and bandwidth costs of n-gram morphing increase.
7.4 Evaluation
In this section, we empirically show that our scheme can dierentiate ngerprints of
websites morphed by packet sizes with limited ordering information, and we verify that
there is signicant bandwidth overhead for n-gram (n  2) morphing.
7.4.1 Fingerprint Dierentiation under Trac Morphing
We perform three sets of experiments to evaluate the ngerprint dierentiation ability
of our scheme under trac morphing. We use Liberatore and Levine's scheme [50] for
performance comparison, and refer to it as the reference scheme. Our scheme that per-
forms preprocessing is referred to as the improved scheme, otherwise it is called the basic








































Figure 7.1: Distribution of distance between morphed trac and the mimicked target
Dierentiating Morphed Trac
We take 2,000 websites as the mimicked targets, and generate the morphed trac such
that the packet size distributions are within L1 distance of 0.3 between a morphed trac
and its target. The same L1 distance threshold is used in the trac morphing scheme [90].
For each target website, we generate 4 variants of the morphed distributions, and draw 5
instances from each variant. The distance in our scheme is measured using edit distance;
while that in the reference scheme [50] is 1   S, where S is Jaccard's coecient. The
distribution of the distances between the morphed trac and the target trac in unigram
morphing and bigram morphing are shown in Figure 7.1a and Figure 7.1b, respectively.
For unigram morphing as shown in Figure 7.1a, compared to the reference scheme, our
scheme shifts rightwards the range of distances from 95% in the interval [0.1, 0.4] to 95%


















Figure 7.2: Identication accuracy of k websites that morph to the same target
in [0.4, 0.8]. The larger distance indicates that our scheme dierentiates more clearly the
morphed trac and the target. The vertical bar at 0.3 indicates the distance threshold,
and a test returning a value below the threshold means that the distance evaluation cannot
separate the morphed instance and the mimicked target. For the reference scheme, 75%
of the tests fail; while for our method, there is only 1.0% error cases, i.e., our scheme
dierentiates 99% of the morphing trac. As shown in Figure 7.1b, the experiment on
bigram morphing yields similar results. For the reference scheme, 78% of the tests fail;
while for our method, there is only 1.3% error cases. The experiment result shows that
although trac morphing is eective against the reference scheme, our scheme is highly
resistant to it.
Identifying Multiple Websites Morphed to the Same Target
We extend the evaluation to multiple websites morphing to the same target, and compare
the distinguishability using our scheme, the reference scheme and random guess. We take
20 disjoint sets of k websites, where the rst (k   1) websites bigram morph towards the
k-th website. Each morphing website generates 6 instances, 3 as learning samples and
the rest 3 as test cases. We vary k from 2 to 6, and measure the identication accuracy
of morphed traces in each set. The average identication accuracy of all sets at each k is
presented in Figure 7.2.
When our scheme dierentiates between k = 2 websites, i.e. the source and target of
morphing, it yields a high identication accuracy of 85%. As k increases, more websites
share the same morphing target, the accuracy gradually decreases. When k = 6 candi-
dates, which means ve source websites morph to one target, our scheme has an accuracy



















Figure 7.3: Identication accuracy of k morphed websites among 2,000 other websites
guess gives a probability of 17%. The reference scheme performs not much better than
random guess. It shows that the reference scheme cannot reliably distinguish websites
that share similar packet size distribution. Our scheme is much stronger at dierentiating
among multiple morphing websites and their mimicked target.
Identifying Morphed Trac Mixed with Other Websites
Previous experiments examine the distinguishability within morphing sources and their
target. Next we evaluate the identiability of 20 sets of k morphing websites when they are
mixed with 2,000 other websites. Morphing websites are proled based on their morphed
traces. We set the L1 distance threshold to be 0.4 in screening websites by packet size
distributions. The threshold is slightly larger than in morph algorithm computation
to accommodate some incompliance between the computed and generated packet size
distributions. The incompliance is caused by packet splitting which generates new packets
that are not accounted for in the computation of morph algorithm. Yet the threshold
cannot be too large, so as to avoid keeping as candidates of websites not in the morphing
relationship. Large threshold in L1 distance will add noise to the identication.
The identication accuracies are shown in Figure 7.3. Comparing Figure 7.3 and Fig-
ure 7.2, our improved scheme performs equally well when it identies k morphing websites
among a large set of unrelated websites and when it dierentiates within the morphing
websites. When k varies from 2 to 6, our improved scheme has an identication accuracy
ranges from 78% to 50%, while the reference scheme has a corresponding range of 52% to
26%. Even when k = 6, meaning each target website has 5 imitators, our identication
accuracy of the imitators is still 50%. The performance of our basic scheme in Figure 7.3
degrades compared to in Figure 7.2, because some morphed traces incidentally map to
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websites unrelated by morphing. However, its performance is still better than the refer-
ence scheme. Our basic scheme identies the morphing websites with an accuracy of 61%
at k = 3, the reference scheme correctly identies 39%.
We run our improved scheme on 2,000 non-morphing websites. It gives the same
identication accuracy of 81% as the basic scheme in this case. It is compatible to web-
site ngerprinting at the absence of morphing, since non-morphing websites have HTTP
streams that are consistent in both packet size distributions and ordering.
7.4.2 Bandwidth Overhead of N-Gram (N  2) Morphing
We perform an experiment to verify that there are few choices of packet sizes for the n-th
packet once the previous n   1 packet sizes are xed. We retrieve 6-second trac from
2,000 most popular websites, and analyze the distribution of the sizes of n consecutive






















Figure 7.4: Distribution of the number of possible packet sizes for n-gram morphing
In Figure 7.4, for trigram, 4-gram and 5-gram morphing, once the sizes of the previous
2, 3 and 4 packets are xed, there is only one possible packet size for the third, fourth
and fth packet with probability 31.2%, 48.5% and 61.0%, respectively. Similarly, there
are no more than three possible packet sizes for the n-th packet with probability 54.2%,
69.4% and 77.2% for trigram, 4-gram and 5-gram morphing, respectively. The experiment
results show that with high chance, there are very limited parameters that can be adjusted
to reduce the bandwidth overhead. Thus when morphing considers packet ordering for
n  3, it becomes very poor in bandwidth eciency.
We further present the numerical evaluation on the bandwidth overhead of bigram
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morphing (n = 2), in comparison to mice-elephant packet padding. Though Wright et al.
have evaluated n-gram morphing (n = 2; 3) on other applications, the bandwidth overhead
on defending against website ngerprinting they presented was only for unigram morphing
(n = 1), in comparison to padding packets to the path MTU [90]. Mice-elephant packet
padding is a simple and eective padding scheme against website ngerprinting, and it
causes less bandwidth overhead compared to maximum packet padding.
We use traces of 100 websites from the SSH2000 dataset. The i-th website is morphed
to the (i + 1)-th website. Packet sizes can be increased through padding and decreased
through fragmentatioin. Each HTTP stream is morphed 5 times. The average overhead
is presented in Figure 7.5.
Figure 7.5a shows the percentage of added packets due to trac morphing. The added
packets are caused by packet splitting, which are not captured in but in fact change
the source packet size distribution. The pre-computed morphing matrix does not apply
to optimize the transformation of the dynamically added packets. The target sizes of
these packets are sampled from the target size distribution to ensure they too follow the
distribution after morphing. Transmission of extra packets incurs overhead in bandwidth
and delay. From our data, more than 7 times of packets are added due to morphing
for some website. Creation of extra packets is most severe when the source packets are
mostly large while the target packets are mostly small. The source packets are fragmented
several times iteratively.
Figure 7.5b shows the average added bytes per packet by morphing and mice-elephant.
We count only the bytes padded due to morphing a small packet to a large one, but not the
header bytes added due to packet splitting. A packet may be split one or multiple times.
Only the initial split is guided by the morphing matrix, subsequent morphing operations
depend on the sampling of target sizes. The randomness can aect the amount of added
header bytes observed. Yet we note that if added packet headers are accounted, the
average added bytes per packet will increase. Using mice-elephant, 80% websites have
150 to 300 bytes of overhead per packet; but using trac morphing, about 90% websites
need to send 300 to 500 extra bytes for each packet, which is much higher than mice-
elephant. When source distribution contains a large percentage of small packets, while
target distribution contains many large packets, then the padded bytes per packet is
expected to be high.
Figure 7.5c shows the overall bandwidth overhead, comparing bigram morphing and
mice elephant packet padding. Similar to the measurement of added bytes per packet,
we do not count the bytes of added packet headers. From the gure, we can see that
20% websites have bandwidth overhead more than 100% of the actual data, using bigram
morphing. The overall bandwidth overhead can be 4 times of the original source trac.
While using mice-elephant packet padding, 75% websites have the bandwidth overhead
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less than 50% of the total source packet sizes, and only 5% websites have bandwidth
overhead more than the total source packet sizes.
We have discounted the packets needed to make the amount of data similar between
the source and target websites, in the overhead measurement of morphing. If a target
website has more data than the source website and the morphing scheme takes that
into account, then the overhead of trac morphing in terms of additional packets, extra
bandwidth and padded bytes per packet may increase from the data we present here.
In short, our experiment shows that n-gram morphing is less bandwidth ecient than a
simple mice-elephant packet padding even when n = 2.
7.5 Countermeasures
Existing proposals of countermeasures to website ngerprinting cover up trac features
by modifying the packet sizes. The operations range from padding packets, repackaging
packets to a single size and adding dummy trac. Yet most countermeasures (e.g. packet
padding and dummy trac) are not deployed in practise due to the large bandwidth
overhead they incur.
We suggest an alternative countermeasure that uses randomness to weaken the abil-
ity of website ngerprinting. The countermeasure randomizes on both packet sizes and
request ordering, as information from size and timing channels can be exploited by web-
site ngerprinting schemes. To muddle the ordering of object downloads, we have the
browser to randomize the object request order. To conceal the request and object sizes,
we have the server and the browser to package data into randomly sized packets. The
countermeasure incurs low much bandwidth overhead.
Randomizing the Ordering of Object Requests
The website ngerprints we extract are consistent because of the predictable behaviors of
HTTP and browser. As part of a countermeasure, we propose randomizing the ordering of
object requests by browser. This functionality can be easily incorporated by implementing
it as a browser plug-in. With the plug-in, browser buers x HTTP requests of embedded
objects, and sends them in a random order, where x can be a random number dynamically
generated at each web access. The cost of it lies in buering the object requests which
may delay the presentation of a webpage slightly.
Randomizing the Packet Sizes
To make the sizes and ordering of packets untraceable, browser and web server each
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Figure 7.5: Comparison of bandwidth overhead between bigram morphing and mice-
elephant packet padding
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packets of the random sizes. The operations include splitting the packet data and merging
data from multiple packets.
Web server generates a random number when there is data to transmit. If the data
have fewer bytes than the random number, server waits for more data. This incurs some
buering delay. If no more data are to be sent, or the waiting time expires, the server
simply releases the packet. If the amount of data is more than the randomly generated
target size, server splits the packet, and processes the remainder of the packet in the same
way. Random delay can be added to conceal which packet sizes have been touched up in
the HTTP stream. Although data buering causes delay, the countermeasure signicantly
increases the diculty of website ngerprinting.
We remark that neither packet padding nor the countermeasure we propose is perfect.
They only hide most of the consistent features available for ngerprint. An HTTP stream
still leaks information on the approximate total size of a website. In addition, packet
padding cannot change the number of object requests. Hence dummy trac is needed to
cover up these features. The dummy trac should be augmented without distinguishable
patterns in sizes or timing, in order to prevent ltering or statistical trac analysis. It
presents a tradeo between communication anonymity and communication eciency in
time and bandwidth.
7.6 Summary
Our website ngerprinting scheme is designed to withstand trac morphing. Essentially,
our scheme is eective even under trac morphing because trac morphing cannot han-
dle packet ordering and satisfy low bandwidth overhead simultaneously, whereas we are
able to identify and exploit the seemingly noisy packet ordering information for website
ngerprinting. If morphing considers packet ordering information, its computation cost,
storage cost and bandwidth overhead all increase. Its bandwidth eciency is worse than
mice-elephant packet padding, even in bigram morphing. Our scheme is able to iden-
tify websites from morphed trac with signicantly higher accuracy than the previous
scheme.
Most existing countermeasures to website ngerprinting are not deployed in practice
for bandwidth eciency concerns. We propose some countermeasure with almost zero
bandwidth overhead. To defend against website ngerprinting, we randomize the packet
sizes and the order in which embedded objects of a webpage are fetched. Eectiveness
of the countermeasures depends on the aggressiveness in applying them, though at a
correspondingly heavy cost of performance and hence user satisfaction. While padding
trades o network bandwidth to conceal the packet sizes; our proposed countermeasure




We consider the trac model of web browsing over Tor, where the HTTP stream is encrypted,
tunneled and the data are transmitted in xed sized units. Building on the passive website nger-
printing systems over SSH and SSL tunnels, we propose an active website ngerprinting model
over Tor. By spacing out the object requests, the active approach obtains the sizes and order of
web objects as website ngerprints.
8.1 Overview
Tor [25] is a popular circuit-based low-latency anonymous communication network. It
provides anonymity protection to users over TCP applications, e.g. web browsing. The
web browsing trac ows through a Tor circuit in xed length cells, encrypted and
decrypted by Tor routers in an onion-like fashion. A Tor circuit typically consists of three
routers, which are called entry node, middle node and exit node respectively. The Tor
routers chosen to form a circuit can be user specied or randomly selected. Tor sets up
three connections along a circuit, such that it can switch connections to transmit data if
the current connection is not stable.
Some research works have investigated attacks that degrade the anonymity provided
by Tor, notably trac conrmation attacks [87, 94] and statistical disclosure attacks [9, 44,
22, 52]. Trac conrmation attack embeds some ow watermark into sender's outbound
trac and verify the watermark at the suspected receiver to conrm a communicating pair.
Statistical disclosure attack correlates sender's outbound trac and receiver's inbound
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trac in terms of timing or volume to statistically disclose the likely communication
relationship. Note that these attacks require an adversary to be able to monitor the
trac at both ends of a communication.
We consider a website ngerprinting attack against Tor whose objective is to link a
user with the website the user accesses through Tor. The attack allows an adversary
to prole user interests and their web browsing habits. Existing website ngerprint-
ing schemes [40, 78, 10, 50] target at certain encrypted communication tunnels, such as
SSH tunnel or VPN. Yet they are not applicable to Tor. Fingerprinting schemes based on
packet size related features [10, 50] do not work on Tor, as Tor transmits messages in xed
length cells. Existing schemes that use web object sizes as ngerprint features [40, 78]
hold simplied assumptions about trac patterns and hence cannot extract the desired
features realistically. The size of a web object was determined by accumulating the data
received through a TCP connection, assuming TCP connections were not reused to down-
load multiple embedded objects [40]. Alternatively, it was determined by accumulating
the data received between adjacent HTTP requests, assuming object requests were not
pipelined [78]. However, HTTP supports pipelining and TCP connections are reused.
A key diculty that prevents passive ngerprinting models from identifying features of
web objects lies in the ambiguity in distributing data packets back into their respective
objects. Message chunks cannot be dierentiated by packet sizes in Tor.
We propose an active website ngerprinting model that extracts web object sizes and
order as the ngerprint features. The scheme achieves a promising accuracy when it is
used against Tor. In our active approach, the adversary holds each HTTP object request
for a couple of seconds before releasing it into the network, to ensure that web objects
are downloaded one at a time in each TCP connection. The adversary measures for each
outgoing request the number of corresponding incoming Tor packets, which is counted as
a web object size. The adversary extracts the ngerprint of a website from its web object
sizes and order when the website is fetched via Tor. A testing ngerprint is matched
against the ngerprint database to determine the website a user surfs.
While anonymous email systems are designed to resist attacks in which all communi-
cation links are being monitored, Tor aims to protect the anonymity of its users only from
non-global adversaries. Tor assumes an adversary has the ability to observe and control
part of the network, but not its totality. Even though it is controversial whether Tor's
restriction on attacker's capability is realistic, our attack demonstrates that an adversary
can extract vital information about the anonymously accessed websites for identication,
without stepping outside the threat model considered by Tor.
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Figure 8.1: Trac intervention and analysis setup
8.2 Active Website Fingerprinting Model
Our active website ngerprinting model is designed for Tor, yet it applies to website n-
gerprinting over other proxy plus encryption technologies, including SSH or TLS tunnels
and VPN. Tor trac is comparatively the most dicult to ngerprint, as it leaks the
least amount of size related information. Whereas other technologies do not intensionally
cover up the size related features.
8.2.1 Trac Analysis Setup
We propose an active website ngerprinting model. The setup for trac analysis over
Tor is illustrated in Figure 8.1. The victim host is connected to the adversary, which in
turn connects to the Tor entry node, and the exit Tor node connects to the web server
to fetch the user desired webpage. The adversary is a man-in-the-middle between the
victim and the Tor entry node, and hence able to tamper with victim's trac. When
victim's packets arrive at the adversary, they are held for a couple of seconds before being
forwarded to the entry Tor router. In real life, such adversaries can possibly be company
network administrators monitoring web accesses of its employees, or ISPs gathering web
access statistics or proling user interests.
Comparing Figure 8.1 and Figure 6.1, we can see the trac analysis setups for website
ngerprinting over dierent channels are similar. The dierence is that the adversary not
only eavesdrops but also intervenes with the transmission of an HTTP stream over Tor.
Note that a Tor circuit is set up with three routers by default, which eliminates any single
point from knowing both the source and destination of a session. It is arguably stronger
in providing anonymity in web browsing. Yet in our website ngerprinting models, it
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does not matter how many proxies are lying behind the adversary. The same eect is
achieved that the HTTP stream is encapsulated and encrypted. The dierence between
an anonymous channel through Tor and through an SSH or SSL tunnel is that Tor sends
messages in xed length cells. This dierence urges us to use an active ngerprinting
approach, as any size related features are hard to be extracted with a passive model over
Tor.
Our active model exploits the side channel information about web objects as features
of website ngerprints, while supporting the common trac patterns in HTTP streams.
The trac patterns our model accommodates include multiple TCP connections within
a session and HTTP pipelining. As several objects can be concurrently downloaded in
dierent connections, we keep track of connections individually. HTTP pipelining allows
multiple objects to be downloaded in a pipelined fashion within a connection, so data of
dierent objects can interleave. We extract per web object features by intervening with
the transmission of HTTP requests, which undoes pipelining to the eect.
Like other web ngerprinting schemes, our attack involves the adversary to build a
ngerprint database which is applied to match the victim's trac. To build the ngerprint
database, the adversary surfs to a large set of frequently accessed websites, and apply the
active ngerprinting technique to extract the ngerprints of each website. Fingerprint
from the victim's HTTP stream is extracted similarly, which is then matched with the
ngerprint database for website identication.
Our website ngerprinting model is within Tor's security model. Tor's security model
allows a non-global observer and allows control over part of the Tor network. We monitor
the encrypted and proxied trac only at the client end of a web browsing session. The
requirement on adversary's capability is even easier to satisfy than trac conrmation
attacks.
8.2.2 Features for Fingerprint
We select the features for website ngerprinting by examining the process that a web
browser fetches a webpage. Typical communication between a client browser and a web
server for downloading a webpage is illustrated in Figure 2.1. Given a website URL, web
browser fetches the webpage by rst issuing an HTTP GET request. In response, the web
browser receives an HTML object which may contain references to other web objects,
such as graphics les or style sheets. The web browser then parses the HTML le, and
issues an HTTP GET request for each of the embedded web objects. The GET requests
are usually sent in parallel on multiple TCP connections, so as to speed up the process
and prevent a single GET failure from delaying the rest of the webpage download. Thus,
downloading a webpage actually results in sending a (xed or variable) number of GET
requests in some order. We observed that for the same web browser (eg. Firefox), the
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order in which the GET requests are sent remains fairly stable.
We use web object sizes and their ordering as features of a website ngerprint. Object
based features are more persistent and more characteristic of a website than packet based
features. The selected features represent properties of web objects and reect the layout of
a webpage. The consistent ordering of embedded objects in webpage retrievals roots from
that the layout of a webpage is infrequently changed, and that a web browser uses the same
strategy to schedule requests of the embedded objects. Passive techniques are insucient
to extract object sizes and their associated ordering from Tor, thus we propose using an
active approach that delays the subsequent HTTP GET requests in order to determine
the size of the currently being downloaded object. We describe details of our ngerprint
extraction method in Section 8.3.1.
We could track the size sequence of all embedded objects, but it incurs substantial
delay in the webpage presentation. Hence we choose to monitor only the rst n objects
in a website download. Our experiments show that with only 10 objects monitored per
website, the ngerprint identication already achieves high accuracy. We note that the
identication accuracy will increase as the number of objects being monitored increases,
yet at the same time, so will the incurred delay be increased.
In addition to web object sizes and ordering, we keep track of the total size in ob-
ject requests and that in object responses, as they are helpful to dierentiate websites
especially when the websites' partial object size sequences are similar.
In short, the ngerprint FA of website A is FA = (qA; tA), where qA = hs1; s2; s3; :::sni
is a sequence representing the rst n object sizes, and tA = (xA; yA) where xA and yA are
the total request and response sizes respectively.
8.2.3 Similarity Comparison
To match the ngerprint extracted from a testing packet stream against the website
ngerprints in the database, we need some similarity measurement mechanism. The
measurement should take into consideration the ordering of feature values and be ecient.
We extend edit distance and apply it to the similarity comparison of website ngerprints
over Tor.
We adapt edit distance to measure the distance between two integer sequences, where
each sequence represents order and sizes of the downloaded objects of a webpage. Edit
distance is often used to measure the dissimilarity of two strings. The common edit
operations it allows include insertion, deletion and substitution of a single character.
We propose supplementing split, merge, and split and merge to the list of allowed edit
operations on integer sequences. Given integer sequences SA = hci and SB = ha; bi, SA
can be transformed into SB using a single split operation, if a and b sum to c. Merge
is the reverse operation to split. It combines two neighboring integer values into one.
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Given SB = ha; bi and SC = hc; di, a split and merge operation can change SB to SC if
a + b = c + d. It accounts for the eect that part of b is split and grouped with a, or
part of a is split and clustered with b. The same modication can be eected with two
substitutions, but the associated costs are dierent.
The reason we extend edit distance with the above operations is to handle dierences in
website ngerprints due to variations in network delay and HTTP pipelining conguration.
If pipelining is enabled, an Ethernet packet may contain more than one short object
requests. Tor proxy located at the client host sends out the Ethernet packet part by
part in sizes of Tor's transmission unit. Two object requests could be released within the
same Tor packet, if the last part of the rst request and the whole of the second request
are contained in one Tor packet. Thus data of the two responses may interleave and
cluster in time, despite we articially space out object requests by Tor packets. Pipelining
conguration and browser processing delay determine if multiple requests are packed into
one Ethernet packet and hence aect the observable sequence of object sizes. They can
vary across traces even if the website has not updated. Merge and split correspond to
clustering two object sizes or not in ngerprint comparisons. Network delays also aect
the clustering of object data, as our identication of object boundaries is based on timing
heuristics. Prolonged delay of some intermediate response packets can lead to a false
identication of object boundary and hence the remaining data of the current object be
accumulated with data of the next object. Split and merge caters for regrouping partial
object data in similarity measurement.
8.3 Website Fingerprinting Scheme
In this section, we describe how we implement the active website ngerprinting model
proposed.
8.3.1 Determining Object Sizes and Order
We take an active approach to determine web object sizes and ordering with some heuris-
tics. To handle multiple connections set up through a Tor circuit, we monitor each
connection individually. We maintain state variables of each connection and swap them
in and out as required by parsing the Tor packet stream. In addition to multiple connec-
tions and HTTP pipelining, Tor obfuscates website features against passive observation
using techniques of encapsulation, encryption and unifying packet sizes. HTTP pipelin-
ing allows several object requests to be concurrently served, so data of dierent objects
can interleave within a connection. Web server address is encapsulated into the packet
payload. Encryption protects the data condentiality. Uniform data transmission unit
destroys most size related features about packets. It is important to distinguish data
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Figure 8.2: Distribution of per-trace unique packet sizes of 2,000 popular websites [50]
packets from control packets, and to associate data packets to their respective objects for
object size identication.
Identifying Object Responses with Heuristics on Sizes
A Tor packet cannot be distinguished individually whether it belongs to data packets or
control packets, but we can classify a packet depending on whether it forms a response
alone or with several other packets. To distinguish response data packets from control
packets, we use a heuristic that for ecient transmission, control packets tend to be
smaller than 1KB, or equivalent to 2 Tor packets (512 bytes each) or less, hence responses
containing more than 2 Tor packets are likely transmitting object data. Although websites
often have objects that are smaller than 1KB, we do not use sizes of these objects as
website features, because small objects mix with control packets in sizes, and it is the
larger objects revealing more distinctive information about websites after all.
We remark that we cannot reliably distinguish each request size. Most object requests
are 400 to 600 bytes or 900 to 1000 bytes long (request size statistics of 2,000 websites are
shown in Figure 8.2). It is possible that a request spans over more than one Tor packet,
thus an outgoing packet yielding no responses could be a control packet as well as part
of an incomplete request. Fortunately, our goal is to obtain individual object sizes in a
sequence, which is sucient for ngerprinting websites with good accuracy, the request
sizes only provide additional information if available.
Determining Object Boundaries by Request Holding and Heuristics on Timing
To cluster response packets that belong to one object and hence determining the object
size, we articially space out the object requests. We release victim's outgoing Tor packets
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one at a time, and hold any subsequent outgoing Tor packets until all the response data
to the currently released Tor packet have been received. Thus a response size can be
determined by accumulating the amount of data received in correspondence to a request.
Because of encryption and uniform packet sizes, we cannot distinguish by clear markers
where an object's data end. Instead, we use a heuristic based on timing to determine
object boundaries. We assume object data comes in a stream such that the packet intervals
are reasonably small. If we wait for an interval, and there is no incoming packets, we
consider the object download is completed. The threshold of packet interval must be
greater than the round trip time of the connection for the rst data packet, otherwise
an object boundary will be falsely determined before the rst data packet comes back.
Yet once the rst packet comes back, the incoming packet intervals are caused only by
processing delays of web server and Tor routers, and aected by the network connection
conditions. So the interval threshold for subsequent packets can be smaller. In our
experiments, we set the packet interval threshold to be T1 = 5 seconds before the rst
response packet arrives, and T2 = 2 seconds for subsequent packets. Compared to using
T1 alone, having two timers T1 and T2 speeds up the downloading of a webpage, for
otherwise there would be some unnecessary waiting time after the last data packet of an
object is received.
8.3.2 Fingerprint Similarity Comparison
Edit distance measures the number of edit operations to make two strings identical. The
common edit operations considered are insertion, deletion and substitution of a single
character.
We extend edit distance to match object size sequences of website ngerprints. Since
the observed object sizes may split or merge due to HTTP pipelining or delay variations,
we extend edit distance to allow split and merge operations. Pseudocodes to compute our
extended edit distance is shown in Appendix B.
The extended edit distance can be computed using Dijkstra's shortest path algorithm.
We search for the minimal distance from n(0; 0) to n(jqAj; jqBj), where n(i; j) is a node
corresponding to the i-th element of qA and the j-th element of qB, and jqj is the length
of sequence q. The nodes are connected by edit operations with associated costs.
The costs of edit operations are tunable. We consider insert, delete and substitute
should have a higher cost than a split or merge. This is because in website ngerprints,
split or merge of an object size is transient and due to HTTP pipelining or delay variations,
but insert, delete or substitute reects the change of embedded objects of websites.
We normalize edit distance by an upper bound of the distance between sequences qA
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and qB, as shown in Formula 8.1.
Ed(qA; qB) =
DijkstraDistance(qA; qB)
max(jqAj; jqBj)  c (8.1)
where jqj denotes the length of sequence q, and c is a cost factor which we set as the
deletion cost.
Dierence in the total sizes tA and tB of websites A and B are measured by summing
their absolute dierences in request and response sizes, and normalized by their total size,
as shown in Formula 8.2.
L1(tA; tB) =
jxA   xBj+ jyA   yBj
xA + xB + yA + yB
(8.2)
where xI and yI are the total request and response sizes of website I respectively, and
jxA   xBj is the absolute dierence between xA and xB.
The similarity measure between website ngerprints FA and FB combines the infor-
mation on object sequences and total sizes. It is computed as Formula 8.3.
Sim(FA; FB) = 1  Ed(qA; qB)  w1 + L1(tA; tB)  w2
w1 + w2
(8.3)
where w1 and w2 are adjustable parameters, representing the weights of similarity in object
size sequences and total sizes respectively. We set w1 = max(jqAj; jqBj) and w2 = 2, so
that the weights correspond to the number of feature values considered. (1 - normalized
distance) converts the measurement from distance to similarity. Identity of a test stream
is given by the most similar ngerprint of the proled websites.
Example
Suppose we are given two sequences qA and qB, where qA = h123; 780; 465; 324; 230; 235i
and qB = h123; 789; 345; 120i. We evaluate the edit distance between qA and qB with
consideration of our extended set of edit operations.
To make qA identical to qB, the edit operations we allow include insertion, deletion
and substitution of a single element, and in addition, merging two adjacent elements,
splitting an element into two, and redistributing two adjacent elements by merging them
and then followed by a split. Figure 8.3 illustrates these edit operations. Node n(i; j)
corresponds to the i-th element of qA and the j-th element of qB, the edges correspond
to the edit operations with associated costs. qA = h123; :::i can be changed to qB =
h123; 789; :::i by inserting 789 from node n(1; 1). Similarly, qA = h123; 780; :::i can be
modied to qB = h123; :::i by deleting 780 from node n(1; 1), or qA = h123; 780; :::i can
be updated to qB = h123; 789; :::i by substituting 780 to 789 at node n(1; 1). In addition,
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Figure 8.3: Example illustrating edit operations between integer sequences
qA = h:::; 465; :::i can be changed to qB = h:::; 345; 120i by splitting 465 to 345 and 120 at
n(2; 2), or qA = h:::; 465; 324; :::i can be modied to qB = h:::; 789; :::i by merging 465 and
324 to 789 at n(2; 1). Finally, redistribution can be used in updating qA = h:::; 230; 235i
to qB = h:::; 345; 120i from node n(4; 2). Note that insertion, deletion and substitution
traverses the graph by one grid rightwards, downwards and diagonally respectively. In
comparison, split traverses the graph two grids rightwards and one grid downwards, merge
traverses the graph one grid rightwards and two grids downwards, and redistribution
traverses the graph diagonally by two grids. We are amused at its resemblance to walking
a chessman on a chessboard.
To measure the edit distance between qA and qB, we search for a path that traverses
from node n(0; 0) to n(6; 4) with minimum cost. If all the edit operations have a unit cost,
then the edit distance between qA and qB is 3. The path traversed is n(0; 0)-n(1; 1)-n(2; 1)-
n(4; 2)-n(6; 4), and the edit operations performed are deleting 780 at n(1; 1), merging 465
and 324 to be 789 at n(2; 1), and nally redistributing 230 and 235 into 345 and 120 at
n(4; 2), as illustrated in Figure 8.3.
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8.4 Evaluation
We evaluate the eectiveness of our active website ngerprinting scheme by measuring
the ngerprint identication accuracy. Our scheme should be considered eective if any
non-negligible fraction of websites are correctly identied, as Tor is designed to protect
anonymity of the communicating parties.
8.4.1 Data Collection
We collected traces over Tor of surng to 200 unique websites daily in a few weeks.
For each website, only its homepage is fetched. The 200 websites are chosen with the
requirement that each of them generates sucient trac for ngerprinting to be feasible.
With this requirement, our chosen websites all have images and none of them are purely
text-based.
Using the trac analysis setup illustrated in Figure 8.1, victim's outgoing packet
arrives at the adversary machine. The adversary takes note of the packet contents and
then drops the packet. After a few seconds, the adversary recreates the packet with the
same content, and forwards it to the entry Tor router. This creates the eect that the
adversary holds victim's packet for a couple of seconds.
We set the time limit on waiting for the initial data packet to be 5 seconds, and the
subsequent data interval to be less than 2 seconds. Beyond the time limit, we consider the
data transmission with respect to the current request has completed. The rst 11 object
requests are spaced out so that the rst 10 object sizes are revealed. The rest requests
are sent out without holding, to reduce the delay on website presentation.
Both the victim and the adversary were running on linux systems (Fedora Core 8).
The Tor version used when the traces were collected is 0.1.2.17. The victim used Mozilla
Firefox 2.0 to retrieve each URL via a SOCKS proxy (Privoxy). Privoxy then connects
to the local Tor client on the victim's machine. The local Tor client chooses (by default)
3 Tor routers to form a circuit linking to the desired website. Communication between
the victim and the website is tunneled through the circuit.
We congured Firefox not to attempt various extraneous connections, such as due
to live bookmarks or automatic update checks. Browser cache is cleared before surng
to any website. Although disabling these features makes the resulting trac somewhat
less realistic, we believe it is a reasonable tradeo to let us focus on the problem under
investigation.
8.4.2 Identication Accuracy
In order to facilitate analysis and comparison, we classify the websites by their update
frequencies, as either static, which updates once in several months, or dynamic, which
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updates at least daily. There are 50 static websites and 150 dynamic websites.
We examine the performance of our scheme and the eect of website updates. In
particular, we evaluate the website identication accuracies when the test streams and
the proling streams are captured on alternate days, and two weeks apart. 4 training and
4 testing traces per website were captured on alternate days in the \next day test". In the
\half-month test", 4 traces per website sampled in the rst week were used to build the
website ngerprint database, and 4 traces sampled two weeks later were used as testing
traces for identication.
In evaluations, our search of minimal edit distance allows a feature value to be split,
merged, or split and merged at most once, as the delay we impose to isolate the transmis-
sion of objects is suciently large that an object has low probability in being split into
more than two parts. We tune the parameter values based on our dataset, and set the
cost of a single split or merge to be 5, the cost of an insertion, deletion or substitution to
be 6, and the cost of split and merge to be 7.




Table 8.1: Website ngerprint identication accuracies.
The evaluation results are presented in Table 8.1. The identication accuracy of 200
websites is close to 70% in the next day test, and it is above 60% in the half-month
test. As static websites update infrequently, their identication accuracy is not very
sensitive to the age of website ngerprint proles, and it remains at 73.5% for both
tests. For dynamic websites, the identication accuracy drops over time as their contents
change from the proles. Yet even when the proles were built half a month ago, their
identication accuracy is still 62.1%. In comparison, if we randomly guess the website
identity among dynamic websites, the probability of success is only 0.7%. Our scheme
signicantly reduces the anonymity provided by Tor.
8.5 Countermeasures
Applying aggressive padding to objects to conceal their sizes could be a countermeasure
to active website ngerprinting, but it is not bandwidth friendly. Instead, we propose
countermeasures that change the order of object requests and hide the sizes of individual
objects. They incur little bandwidth overhead, and the buering delay they cause tends
to be insignicant.
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(i) Randomizing the object order. Similar to the countermeasure against our passive
website ngerprinting, browser buers several object requests and sends them in dierent
orders each time.
(ii)Mixing data of dierent objects. Browser packages data of dierent HTTP requests
into a packet, such that a number of object requests become concurrent. Correspondingly,
server interleaves data of dierent objects within packets. Thus object boundaries that
previously align with packet boundaries are eliminated. The number of objects and which
objects to request (serve) in each packet are decided with randomness by browser (server)
in each web access, where the randomness helps to prevent ngerprinting. Random delay
can be inserted between packets to further confuse the timing based identication of
object boundaries.
8.6 Summary
We show that anonymous web accesses over Tor can be substantially hampered with
active website ngerprinting, under Tor's somewhat restricted threat model, and without
having to add external packet marks or ow marks.
In our proposed active website ngerprinting model, the adversary spreads HTTP
GET requests issued by the victim client, so that only one GET request is served at a
time. The adversary only releases the next GET request after all response packets are
received for the current request. This helps to measure the corresponding web object size
for each object request. A webpage download thus results in a sequence of web object
sizes, where both the ordering and sizes of web objects are exploited when we match the
website ngerprints.
Our study is the rst in presenting such promising website ngerprinting accuracies
over Tor. Tor is trusted by many in providing a low latency, anonymous communication
channel, but this does not hold under our proposed attack.
106 Active Website Fingerprinting over Tor
Chapter 9
Conclusion and Future Work
We conclude this thesis by summarizing our ndings from monitoring the models and analyzing
the schemes of trac source identication. We also underline the practical constraints that trac
source identication schemes have not handled thus far, and point out directions to enhancing the
framework and improving the scheme designs.
Contributions
In this thesis, we investigated approaches to trac source identication with respect to
dierent trac models and analyst's capabilities. We provided a framework of trac
source identication, in which we laid out interactions between model components and
criteria for scheme designs. The principles are substantiated in our investigation under
several specic problem scenarios, namely, probabilistic packet marking for DDoS trace-
back, passive website ngerprinting over VPN and active website ngerprinting over Tor.
Our ndings through the investigations are summarized below.
Trac Source Identication Framework. We developed a framework of trac source
identication models. The framework captures the important components of traf-
c source identication design: obfuscation techniques applied on the source data
and analyst's capability. Existing source identication schemes are classied in the
framework by their component values. We deduced from the framework that it is
possible to perform trac analysis over Tor to identify the website accessed. We
considered in the framework criteria to developing a trac source identication
scheme under several models. We considered minimizing collisions in packet marks
for the PPM model of DDoS traceback, and that features in website ngerprinting
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are desired to present consistency for a website and maximum separation among
websites. Overall, our framework is useful in classifying trac source identication
schemes, deriving novel source identication models, and guiding the construction
of source identication schemes.
General Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM) Model. Packet marking applies when
the investigator is able to modify the packet header, which requires the packet head-
ers are not encapsulated. We found an eective probabilistic packet marking scheme
does not require sophisticated structure, if some network topology information is
know. This is on the contrary to what previous works deliver. We also found that
to fairly compare variants of packet marking schemes despite of their dierences
in assumptions, we can utilize the metric on the entropy of packet marks. Higher
entropy indicates better utilization of the marking eld and more information is
transmitted, which then predicts a higher source identication accuracy assuming
an optimal path reconstruction algorithm.
PPM Scheme: Random Packet Marking (RPM). Inspired by the ndings from the
general PPM model, we developed a packet marking scheme named Random Packet
Marking (RPM). It is designed with high randomness in the packet marks generated,
and hence it obtains signicant performance improvement over prior work.
Passive Website Fingerprinting Scheme Exploiting Packet Ordering. Passive traf-
c ngerprinting applies when the trac itself carries sucient identifying informa-
tion, such as the packet size distribution of a website. We found that besides packet
sizes, packet ordering is fairly consistent for a webpage download. Such information
is exposed regardless of encryption and proxy. Thus we developed a passive webstie
ngerprinting scheme applicable to VPN, SSH or TLS encrypted tunnels, which
utilizes the packet ordering information to enhance the identication accuracy of
website ngerprints.
Analysis of Scheme Robustness against Trac Morphing. Besides to enhance the
website identication accuracy, an important motivation of incorporating the packet
ordering information into website ngerprints is that the ordering information en-
ables the website ngerprinting scheme to withstand trac morphing [90]. Trac
morphing defends against website ngerprinting by transforming the packet size
distribution of the source website to mimic a target website, while minimizing the
bandwidth overhead. It targets at website ngerprinting schemes that exploit size
related features only. We empirically veried that our scheme is robust against
trac morphing, as our scheme can dierentiate websites having similar packet
size distributions by packet ordering. We analyzed the trac morphing scheme
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and showed that it cannot handle packet ordering while satisfying low bandwidth
overhead. If some ordering information is considered, its bandwidth eciency will
be worse than some simple countermeasure of packet padding. Our analysis im-
plies that an eective countermeasure to website ngerprinting should aggressively
remove trac features in both size and timing channels. We thus suggest randomiz-
ing both packet sizes and the ordering of HTTP requests to defend against website
ngerprinting.
Active Website Fingerprinting Model and Scheme over Tor. Extending from the
passive techniques, we proposed an active website ngerprinting model and scheme
over Tor. The active approach helps to recover web object sizes when HTTP re-
quests are pipelined. It works even when packet sizes are xed. The fact that Tor
transmits data in xed length cells fails all website ngerprinting schemes that rely
on packet sizes. We therefore use object sizes and ordering as website ngerprint
features. In order to obtain web object sizes, we space out the download of web
objects by holding HTTP GET requests, so that each object size can be deter-
mined by accumulating the amount of data received in correspondence to a request.
Our active model and scheme demonstrated for the rst time that it is possible to
identify websites accessed through Tor from the size channel.
To perform active trac source identication over Tor, investigators must have the
capability of delaying Tor trac, and the latency caused may be noticeable. Whereas the
passive trac analysis model on VPN requires only eavesdropping and is transparent to
users. There is sucient side channel information gathered from passive observations of
VPN trac to yield high website identication accuracy. Having said that, the model we
designed for Tor is guaranteed to further improve the VPN ngerprinting accuracy, since
more accurate and reliable features on objects are obtained.
Practical Considerations
We dealt with some of the methodological issues found in previous work that raise ques-
tions about the real-world performance of the techniques. In particular, our passive
website ngerprinting model moves beyond the closed-world examination to a more re-
alistic setting where a website must be detected from among a set of websites that the
adversary may not even know about. We also evaluated the identication accuracy of
website ngerprints with examinations of pipeline congurations, website variability, and
the amount of training data.
However, there are still a couple of idealized assumptions in the models and analysis.
In particular, probabilistic packet marking schemes for DDoS traceback all assume routers
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are cooperative. Because routers are administered under dierent autonomous systems
whose management policies are largely independent, it is not easy to ensure routers along
the attack paths are cooperative.
So far website ngerprinting proposals have not addressed the problem of concurrent
web browsing sessions. All of them assumed that HTTP streams of dierent browsing
sessions are separated correctly. In practise, it is not trivial to parse packets to their
respective HTTP streams from encapsulated and encrypted trac. Multiplexing connec-
tions over a single port complicates the matter and makes it more dicult.
Handling caching is another practical problem. The accuracy of website ngerprinting
would be substantially deteriorated if caching is enabled. Browser caching aects the
download of a webpage in that cached web objects are retrieved from the local cache
and are removed from the trac trace. Dierences in the browser caches make the
HTTP streams vary in dierent accesses to the same website. All proposals up to date
have their performances heavily undermined by browser caches, which underlines the
diculty of the problem. The dynamics of cache contents makes the evaluation results
probabilistic. Generally, evaluation with certain cache congurations presents limited
analysis that tends to be biased. Further systematic and comprehensive modeling and
measurement of cache as attributed to network buer constraints or user behaviors is
required. Fingerprinting models that take care of browser caching are yet to be proposed.
Partly because of the gap between the research settings and the practical trac con-
ditions, the threat to user privacy caused by the trac source identication techniques
is not arousing enough awareness it deserves. Even simple countermeasures are not de-
ployed, for the currently proposed countermeasures all require paying the price of large
bandwidth overhead or processing overhead.
However, when the technical assumptions are satised, trac source identication
presents a real threat to user privacy. Our proposals and experiments have made it clear
that web clients' privacy can be compromised to a certain extend and the operations
are easy to perform. In the performance centric design of Internet services, the idealis-
tic defense proposals have insucient deployment incentives. Therefore, not until more
lightweight countermeasures are proposed, web users should remain alert of the capability
of trac source identication by legislative warden or an adversary.
Future Work
In future work for traceback schemes, we would nd inspiration from ow marking tech-
niques and reference schemes related to the identication of stepping stones to design a
traceback model that does not require collaboration of routers across autonomous sys-
tems. Although it is commonly believed that routers are secured and trustworthy, from
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an analysis point of view, it would be interesting to investigate if some routers are ma-
licious. We would analyze the trust management issues on packet marks and develop
countermeasures to eectively isolate forged packet marks.
In future work for website ngerprinting, we would explore dierent methods to model
the structural information of websites and evaluate their eectiveness in improving the n-
gerprint identication accuracy. We would compare the countermeasures, such as packet
padding, dummy trac, randomizing the packet sizes, and randomizing the order of ob-
ject requests, so as to provide an in depth analysis of their robustness and tradeos.
We would extend website ngerprinting to the scenario where concurrent sessions of web
browsing are supported. We would design dierent heuristics and compare their accu-
racy in parsing concurrent browsing sessions from encapsulated and encrypted trac. We
would also extend the evaluation of website ngerprinting to the scenario where caching
of web contents is enabled. We would construct a systematic model of web caching, and
analyze the impact of caching on the eectiveness of website ngerprinting.
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Here we list the similarity comparison primitives mentioned in the body of this thesis,
with explanations on applying them to measure the distance between website ngerprints.
Please note that there are other similarity comparison primitives possible, e.g. support
vector machine.
A.1 L1 Distance
L1 distance is also known as absolute value distance, rectilinear distance or city block
(Manhattan) distance. Instead of the usual Euclidean distance, L1 distance between two
vectors in an n-dimensional real vector space with xed Cartesian coordinate system, is
measured as the sum of the lengths of projections of the line segment between the points




jpk   qkj ;
where p(p1; p2; :::; pn) and q(q1; q2; :::; qn) are vectors, and jdj denotes the absolute value
of d.
L1 distance can be applied onto modeling the distance between points in a city road
grid, or modeling the distance between squares on the chessboard for rooks in chess.
In the application of website ngerprinting, we can use L1 distance to measure the
dissimilarity between packet size distributions of two website ngerprints. The packet
size distributions are represented by vectors p(p1; p2; :::; pn) and q(q1; q2; :::; qn), where pi
or qi represents the probability of a packet having size i. The L1 distance between the
packet size distributions is then computed as the sum of absolute dierences between their
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corresponding probabilities in all possible packet sizes.
A.2 Jaccard's Coecient
Jaccard's coecient measures the similarity of two sets, by evaluating the ratio of common
elements to their union of elements. Jaccard's coecient Jac(X;Y ) is computed as
Jac(X;Y ) =
jX \ Y j
jX [ Y j ;
where X and Y are the sets to compare, and jAj denotes the size of set A. Note that an
input set can be a multiset that contains several elements of the same value, then the set
union and intersection correspond to multisets.
In the application of website ngerprinting, Jaccard's coecient can be used to com-
pare two packet size distributions, or to measure the similarity between the distinct packet
sizes of two HTTP streams. For the comparison in packet size distributions, the input
sets are multisets of packet sizes. For the comparison in distinct packet sizes, the elements
in each input set is unique.
A.3 Naive Bayes Classier
Naive Bayes classier assumes independence between all attributes, and estimates the





In the application of website ngerprinting, we can employ naive Bayes classier to
classify an HTTP stream by its packet size distribution. A contains all the distinct packet
sizes appearing in the stream, and p(aj jCi) is the probability that a packet of website Ci
has size aj .
A.4 Edit Distance
Edit distance measures the minimal number of edit operations, such as insert, delete or
substitute, to make two strings identical. There are well known computation algorithms
for edit distance [84]. Essentially, they perform search considering the allowed edit oper-
ations.
In the application of website ngerprinting, we adopt and customize edit distance to
measure the similarity between two sequences of packet sizes or web object sizes. The
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advantage of using edit distance over Jaccard's coecient or naive Bayes classier is that
edit distance can consider the ordering information, in addition to the sizes information
of packet streams.
Edit distance has been applied in a wide range of applications, such as spell checker in
Google [59] and Microsoft Word [89], identifying plagiarism, comparing DNA sequences
[38, 58], conducting fuzzy search in EXCEL [57, 3] and evaluating dialect distances [36].
We are the rst in applying it to match features of network trac. Edit distance is
appropriate for the application because of the correspondence between edit operations
and network feature values, since packets may be lost, reordered or retransmitted, and
web objects may be added, removed or replaced.
The pseudocodes of Levenshtein Distance is shown below for reference.
Levenshte inDistance ( sequence1 , sequence2 ) f
f o r i = 1 to l en sequence1
f o r j = 1 to l en sequence2
d [ i , j ] = minimum (
d [ i  1, j ] + c o s t d e l e t e ,
d [ i , j  1] + c o s t i n s e r t ,
d [ i  1, j  1] + c o s t s u b s t i t u t e )
end f o r
end f o r
re turn d [ l en sequence1 , l en s equence2 ]
g
Appendix B
Pseudocode of Edit Distance
Extended with Split and Merge
Recall that Levenshtein distance measures edit distance with operations of insert, delete
and substitute a character. We extend Levenshtein distance to allow two more operations,
namely, split and merge, for trac ngerprint comparisons.
We apply Dijkstra's shortest path algorithm to search for the edit distance between
two sequences. It starts traversing from their rst elements till it reaches end of the
sequences. It updates the reduced distance whenever it nds a shorter path to some
intermediate elements. Eectively, each distance d[i,j] is evaluated as
d [ i , j ] = minimum (
d [ i  1, j ] + c o s t d e l e t e ,
d [ i , j  1] + c o s t i n s e r t ,
d [ i  1, j  1] + co s t s ub s t i t u t e ,
d [ i  1, j  2] + c o s t s p l i t ,
d [ i  2, j  1] + cost merge ,
d [ i  2, j  2] + co s t me r g e sp l i t ,
d [ i  1, j  3] + c o s t d oub l e s p l i t ,
d [ i  3, j  1] + cost double merge ,
d [ i  3, j  2] + co s t sp l i t doub l e me rg e ,
d [ i  2, j  3] + co s t me rg e doub l e sp l i t ,
d [ i  3, j  3] + co s t d oub l e me r g e s p l i t ) ,
where i and j are indices of elements in the comparing sequences. It takes into considera-
tion the costs of possible delete, insert, substitute, as well as split and merge operations.
In the demonstrating pseudocodes, we cater for a search space where a group of packets
can be split up to three chunks, or merged vice versa. We assume the cost of substitution
is higher than merge and then split, since packets are more likely re-grouped due to delay
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ExtendedEditDistance ( sequence1 , sequence2 ) f
d [ 1 , 1 ] = minimum (
d [ 0 , 1 ] + c o s t d e l e t e ,
d [ 1 , 0 ] + c o s t i n s e r t ,
d [ 0 , 0 ] + c o s t s u b s t i t i t u e )
Pr ior i tyQueue Q
Q. i n s e r t (d [ i =1, j =1])
while (Q. head != [ i=len sequence1 , j=l en sequence2 ] )
d [ i +1, j ] = minimum (d [ i +1, j ] , d [ i , j ] + c o s t d e l e t e )
d [ i , j +1] = minimum (d [ i , j +1] , d [ i , j ] + c o s t i n s e r t )
d [ i +1, j +1] = minimum (d [ i +1, j +1] , d [ i , j ] + c o s t s u b s t i t u t e )
d [ i +2, j +1] = minimum (d [ i +2, j +1] , d [ i , j ] + cost merge )
d [ i +1, j +2] = minimum (d [ i +1, j +2] , d [ i , j ] + c o s t s p l i t )
d [ i +2, j +2] = minimum (d [ i +2, j +2] , d [ i , j ] + c o s t s p l i t me r g e )
d [ i +3, j +1] = minimum (d [ i +3, j +1] , d [ i , j ] + cos t doub le merge )
d [ i +1, j +3] = minimum (d [ i +1, j +3] , d [ i , j ] + c o s t d o u b l e s p l i t )
d [ i +3, j +2] = minimum (d [ i +3, j +2] , d [ i , j ] + c o s t s p l i t d oub l e me r g e )
d [ i +2, j +3] = minimum (d [ i +2, j +3] , d [ i , j ] + c o s t me r g e doub l e s p l i t )
d [ i +3, j +3] = minimum (d [ i +3, j +3] , d [ i , j ] + c o s t d oub l e s p l i t me r g e )
remove Q. head
Q. i n s e r t d [ i +1, j ] , d [ i , j +1] , d [ i +1, j +1] ,
d [ i +2, j +1] , d [ i +1, j +2] , d [ i +2, j +2] ,
d [ i +3, j +1] , d [ i +1, j +3] , d [ i +3, j +2] , d [ i +2, j +3] , d [ i +3, j +3]
end while
return d [ l en sequence1 , l en s equence2 ]
g
variations than being substituted. So the search in the pseudocode always prefers merge
and split than substitution.
